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 2009 revision: 18 J. CONTEMPORARY LEGAL ISSUES (forthcoming 2009)                     
Enforcing the Bill of Rights against the states: the history and the future 
 
                                 ―And when you ask them ‗How much should we give?‘   
                                  Ooh, they only answer More! More! More!...‖1        
Richard L. Aynes* 
 
The question of whether the Bill of Rights—the first eight amendments to the U.S. 
Constitution—should be applied to and enforced against the states has a long, and in some sense, 
complex history.  Though, as this symposium will demonstrate, there is a difference between 
unanimity and consensus, Professor Randy Barnett has concluded:  
                               ―There is now a scholarly consensus that the  
                                 original meaning of ‗privileges or  
                                 immunities‘ includes the Bill of Rights.‖  2 
A similar conclusion has been reached by Professor Calvin Massey:  
               ―[M]ost of the substantive guarantees of the Bill of Rights have been . . . . 
                     made applicable to the state‖ and ―this debate is now over for all practical 
                     purposes.‖ 3 
As our keynote speaker, Michael Kent Curtis, noted, over the last decade the strength of the 
evidence supporting the enforcement of the Bill of Rights against the states has increased as more 
and more information has been uncovered. 
4
 
                                                 
*John F. Seiberling Chair of Constitutional Law and Director of the Constitutional Law Center at the 
University of Akron, School of Law.  The Constitutional Law Center was one of four established by the 
U.S. Congress in order to commemorate the Bi-Centennial of the U.S. Constitution in 1987.  See 
http://www.uakron.edu/law/cclaw.php.  Comments and suggestions can be sent to raynes@uakron.edu. 
 
A prior version of this paper was presented to the Symposium of the University of San Diego School of 
Law on Incorporation January 7, 2009.  This symposium was co-sponsored by the University of San Diego 
Institute for the Study of Constitutional Originalism.  Special thanks to Professor Donald A. Dripps, who 
organized this important symposium, and to all of the contributors who helped advance our knowledge and 
thoughts about these important issues.  I want to also thank Professor Michael Kent Curtis for commenting 
upon a prior version of this paper.  The views expressed and any errors are, of course, my own.   
 
1
 Creedence Online, Creedence Lyrics: Fortunate Son, http://www.creedence-
online.net/lyrics/fortunate_son.php (last visited Mar. 18, 2009).  
2
 RANDY E. BARNETT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, CASES IN CONTEXT 292 (2008) (emphasis added).   
3
 CALVIN MASSEY, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: POWERS AND LIBERTIES 445-47 (2d. ed. 2005).  
4
 ―The more one looks, the more one finds.‖ Michael Kent Curtis, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES  ___ 
(2009).  As Professor Wildenthal has pointed out, there are some problems with the use of the term 
―incorporation.‖  Bryan Wildenthal, Nationalizing the Bill of Rights: Scholarship and Commentary on the 
 2 
            The purpose of the article is to paint—in broad strokes—the ebb and flow of the debate in 
order to try to identify where we are and what the next frontiers of fourteenth amendment 
scholarship might be.  
I. 
Prior to the Fourteenth Amendment 
            There have always been citizens, lawyers, and judges who believed that the Bill of Rights 
had application to the states.  This is not surprising since those rights are part of our common law 
heritage.  As early as 1819 Justice William Johnson, a Jeffersonian appointee to the Court, 
―obliquely suggested‖ 5 that the seventh amendment guarantee of civil jury trials was applicable 
to the states. 
6
  A year later, in Houston v. Moore, 
7
 Justice Johnson wrote that the provision 
against double-jeopardy ―operates equally upon both‖ the state and the federal governments. 8 
In 1829 one of America‘s leading lawyers, William Rawle,9 published one of the first 
treatises on the American Constitution in which he utilized a textual analysis that concluded that 
only the First Amendment was limited to the federal government.  Because the other amendments 
                                                                                                                                                 
Fourteenth Amendment in 1867-73, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES ____ n.2 (2009).  Though the term 
―incorporate by reference‖ is a common legal term, one of the early, if not the first, uses of the term 
―incorporation‖ in the context of applying the Bill of Rights to the states is found in Coates v. Lawrence, 46 
F. Supp. 414 (S.D. Ga. 1942).  This was not a term that any of the framers or ratifiers used.  I agree that 
―nationalizing‖ the Bill of Rights is a better use of terminology and, yet, prefer ―enforcing‖ the Bill of 
Rights against the states or ―applying‖ the Bill of Rights protections to the states.  For further thoughts on 
the problems with the term ―incorporation‖ see Kurt T. Lash, Beyond Incorporation, 18 J. CONTEMP. 
LEGAL ISSUES ___, (2009) (Draft at 1) (―. . . it is time to abandon the metaphor of incorporation altogether 
. . .  Our search is for the public understanding of texts added to the Constitution in 1868.‖).      
   A further problem is that though the application of the Bill of Rights against the state is commonly held 
to be part of ―substantive due process,‖ this only goes to establish the poverty of the terminology.  It can 
hardly be said that the right to receive notice of the charges against one or the right to a speedy trial is a 
―substantive‖ right rather than a procedural right.  It should be noted that the distinction between 
substantive and procedural due process is an anachronism when applied to the Fourteenth Amendment.  See 
STUART STREICHLER, JUSTICE CURTIS IN THE CIVIL WAR ERA (2005).  I am grateful to Assistant Law 
Librarian Annette Souare and her staff who determined that the first time the term ―substantive due 
process‖ was used by the Supreme court was in Republic National Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 334 U.S. 62, 90 
(1948) (Rutledge, J., dissenting), and the first time the terms ―substantive due process‖ and ―procedural due 
process‖ were used in the same decision was in Shaughnessy v. United State ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 
222-27 (1953) (Justice Jackson, dissenting).  
5
 AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 145 (1998). 
6
 Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S. 235, 240-42 (1819).   
7
 18 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1820) (separate opinion).  
8
 Id.  Akhil Amar notes that ―even here his statement was not free from ambiguity.‖ AMAR, supra note 5, at 
145.  
9
 Rawle had been George Washington‘s first choice for U.S. Attorney General and when Rawle turned the 
position down, Washington appointed him U.S. District Attorney for Philadelphia.  For biographical 
information on Rawle and his prominence, see Richard L. Aynes, Charles Fairman, Felix Frankfurter, and 
the Fourteenth Amendment, 70 CHI-KENT L. REV. 1197, 1247 (1995).    
 3 
were written in general terms, Rawle concluded that they all were enforceable against the states. 
10
 
              Fuller accounts including more state and federal court examples of these pre-Barron 
opinions are found in many works, including those of William W. Crosskey
11
 and Akhil Amar. 
12
  
Crosskey argued that Barron was wrongly decided, 
13
 but Professor Amar collectively refers to 
people holding these views as ―The Barron Contrarians.‖ 14 
     One might imagine that claims that the Bill of Rights applied to the states would have ceased 
after Chief Justice Marshall‘s decision in Barron v. Baltimore.15  This would seem to be 
especially warranted by the fact that Barron was followed by at least eleven Supreme Court cases 
between 1840 and 1866. 
16
 
But such was not the case and post-Barron instances are also documented by  
Crosskey
17
 and Amar. 
18
 Though there are undoubtedly many reasons for this, at least one of them 
is that the people of that generation were not as court-centric as many scholars and judges are 
today.  Further, in some instances, lawyers and judges were simply unaware of the decision in 
Barron.
19
  In some instances, lawyers and judges thought that Barron was wrongly decided.
20
   In 
yet other instances, the Courts may not have found the Bill of Rights to be binding, but 
nevertheless concluded that they were declaratory of general principles of constitutional law and 
common law that applied to the states as constitutional principles. 
21
 
II. 
                                                 
10
 WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 125, 127, 135 (1829 2d. ed.) 
(1970 reprint).  
11
 William Winslow Crosskey, Charles Fairman, ―Legislative History,‖ and the Constitutional limitations 
on State Authority, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 125-131 (1954).  
12
 AMAR, supra note 5, at 145-162.  
13
 Crosskey, supra note 11, at 119. 
14
 AMAR, supra note 5, at 145.   
15
 32 U.S. 243 (1833).  
16
 Citations to these cases, involving the First, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Amendments, are found 
in AMAR, supra note 5, at 354 n.41.   
17
 Crosskey, supra note 11, at 141-43. 
18
 AMAR, supra note 5, at 149-155.  
19
 For example, in the debates over the Fourteenth Amendment Congressman Robert S. Hale (R-NY), a 
New York State Court judge from 1856-1864, was unaware of the holding of Barron and thought the Bill 
of Rights was already enforceable against the states.  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1064 (Feb. 27, 
1866).  For Bingham‘s reply to Hale see CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1064 (Feb. 27, 1866).  For 
other examples involving members of the constitutional convention in Nevada and the Supreme Court of 
Illinois, see Aynes, supra note 9.  CHI-KENT L. REV. at 1247 n.326.   
20
 AMAR, supra note 5, at 153 (citing the example of former New Hampshire Governor C. P. Van Ness 
arguing to the U.S. Supreme Court that ―an error was committed by the Court . . . ‖ in Holmes v. Jennison, 
39 U.S. 540, 555 (1840)).   
21
 Nunn v. Georgia, 1 Ga. 243, 250 (1846).  See AMAR, supra note 5, at 149-155 (collecting and quoting 
cases).   
 4 
In the 39
th
 Congress 
     Citizens who believed they had, or should have, protection against the states under the Bill of 
Rights included an overwhelming majority of the 39
th
 Congress. 
22
  Indeed, though they differed 
on the question of whether the Congress has the power to enforce the Bill of Rights against the 
states, almost to a person the Republican members of Congress believed that the Bill of Rights 
was applicable to the states.  The account of a series of Congressional actions designed to 
implement that belief begins with the Freedman‘s Bureau.   
            The account of how the Freedman‘s Bureau, the ―Bureau for the Relief of Freedmen and 
Referees and other persons,‖ legislated the protection of rights contained in the Bill of Rights 
begins in the chronological middle.  The legislation of July 16, 1866 continued the prior March 3, 
1865 legislation for two additional years.
23
  Its 14
th
 clause provided that ―all citizens‖ would 
enjoy a number of rights necessary to engage in life in 19
th
 century society as a free person.
24
  But 
immediately after listing a number of specific rights, the legislation continued ―to have the full 
and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings concerning personal liberty, personal security, and 
the acquisition, enjoyment, and the disposition of estate, real and personal, including the 
constitutional right to bear arms . . . .‖  25 
     This provision is revealing on at least three levels.  First, the terms ―full and equal‖ tell us that 
there was both a substantive and equality guarantee.  If this were only an equality provision, there 
would be no need for the use of the term ―full.‖ 26  As we think about what ―proceedings‖ would 
guarantee ―personal liberty and personal security,‖ we immediately think about those which 
follow due process and the rights guaranteed against the federal government in the second, fourth, 
fifth, sixth, seventh and eight amendments, or, more commonly (most) of the Bill of Rights.  This 
normal and natural reading of Section 14 is confirmed by the last clause quoted which says that 
                                                 
22
 For a tentative account of the workings of the 39th Congress see Richard L. Aynes, The 39th Congress 
(1865-1867) and the Fourteenth Amendment: Some Preliminary Perpsectives, 42 AKRON L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2009).   
23
 14 Stat. 173 (1866).  
24
 ―. . . the right to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, 
lease, sell, hold and convey real and personal property. . .‖ Id. at 176.  Senator Trumbull (R-Ill.) based 
Congress‘ power to enact the Freedman‘s Bureau upon the Thirteenth Amendment, the Article IV 
Privileges and Immunities Clause, and the authority over naturalization.  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 504 (Jan. 30, 1866).  House Judiciary Chairman James Wilson (R-Iowa), indicated that the 
Committee had changed the description of the beneficiaries from ―inhabitants of‖ to ―citizens of the United 
States in . . .‖  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1292 (Mar. 9, 1866).  This new terminology was 
consistent with Bingham‘s reading of the ellipses in Article IV and was likely the result of trying to 
conform the statute to Article IV, which protected citizens.    
25
 Id.  
26
 This plain meaning of the statute is also articulated in AKHIL REED AMAR THE BILL OF RIGHTS, 
CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 178-179 (1998) and other sources which Professor Amar cites.  
 5 
these ―full and equal‖ rights ―include . . . .the constitutional right to bear arms.‖  The clause could 
have said ―and the constitutional right to bear arms.‖  But the use of the word ―include‖ makes it 
clear that the normal reading is correct: it is not limited to the right to bear arms but includes 
other similar rights such as those protected by other constitutional amendments.
27
  
We know that this is the case, in part, because its author, Senator Lyman Trumbull (R-
Ill.), Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee and a former Illinois Supreme Court Justice, 
indicated that the addition of this explicit protection to the original 1865 act made no change in 
the substance of the statute. 
28
  Moreover, Michael Kent Curtis has documented that this language 
had often been used in the past to include the protections of the Bill of Rights.
29
 
From that provision, we can return to the beginning, with the 1865 Freedman‘s Bureau 
statute whose language read, in relevant part: ―to have the full and equal benefit of all laws and 
proceedings concerning personal liberty, personal security, and the acquisition , enjoyment, and 
the disposition of estate, real and personal . . . .‖  From the plain reading of this provision, the 
confirmation by Trumbull that this provided the same rights as the 1866 amendment, and the 
history of these terms as recounted by Professor Curtis, we know that this 1865 version also 
enforced the Bill of Rights against the states. 
30
  
        Further, we know that the issue of the enforcement of the rights contained in the Bill of 
Rights was a major issue of discussion in the debates over the 1866 Civil Rights Act.  
The cornerstone of anti-slavery theory and anti-slavery judicial decisions from at least 1834 until 
such litigation became unnecessary in 1865, was a normal textual analysis of Article IV, which 
demonstrated that except for the full faith and credit clause of Section 1, there was no power for 
                                                 
27
 Professor Curtis has reached a similar conclusion and documented past legal practices in equating the 
terms ―personal security and liberty‖ with many of the rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.  Michael 
Kent Curtis, The Fourteenth Amendment: Recalling what the Court Forgot, 56 DRAKE L. REV.  911, 936 
(2008).  
28
  CONG. GLOBE, 39th CONG., 1st Sess. 743 (Feb. 8, 1866) (―I think that does not alter the meaning.‖).  I 
am grateful to Professor Curtis for calling this statement to my attention.   The relationship between the 
Bureau and the Amendment, both of which were considered simultaneously in 1866, is shown in Speaker 
Schuyler Colfax‘s ruling, in a debate on a vote to override President Johnson‘s veto of the Freedman‘s 
Bureau Act.  Congressman Bingham (R-Ohio) asked to have placed in the record a newspaper article about 
the veto causing ―rejoicing by the people of the South.‖  CONG. GLOBE, 39th CONG., 1st Sess. 1092 (Feb. 
28, 1866).  When the Democrats objected on relevancy grounds, Speaker Colfax ruled it was relevant 
because of the pending Constitutional amendment.  He indicated that the Bureau act was ―in regard to the 
right of certain persons‖ and that it may be ―within the province of Congress to pass a constitutional 
amendment to secure those rights and the rights of others generally . . . .‖ Id.  
29
 See Curtis, supra note 27, at 923 and n.47 (providing references and authorities to the use of these terms 
as a ―shorthand summary of Bill of Rights liberties‖).  
30
 As Bryan Wildenthal has noted, the Fourteenth Amendment was also intended to ―placed the 
constitutionality of the Freedman‘s Bureau . . . beyond doubt.‖ Wildenthal, supra note 4, at ___  {JCLI at 
133 and n. 456}; See also JACOBUS TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW  201 (1965 ed.).  I had highlighted this 
in my copy of the book, but had forgotten about it until reminded by Professor Wildenthal article.   
 6 
the federal government to enforce Article IV.  This being the case, Congress could not enact the 
fugitive slave acts and, for purposes of consistency, this theory combined with Barron meant that 
Congress also could not enforce the Bill of Rights under Article IV against the states. 
31
 
            Just as it had in the Freedmen‘s Bureau Act, the leadership of the House was determined 
to provide enforcement for the Bill of Rights against the states through the Civil Rights Act.  But 
this presented a dilemma for those who fought so long against slavery.  Should they support their 
prior position and be consistent or should they be pragmatic, adopt a pro-slavery theory, and use 
it to support the Bill of Rights? 
           Congressman John Bingham (R-Ohio), former Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, 
Chairman of the House Committee on Reconstruction, and one of the senior members of the 
House, maintained the view of the idealists. 
32
  On March 9, 1866, Bingham stated that the 
―enforcement of the bill of rights is the want of the Republic.‖ 33  Bingham noted that he wanted 
the Bill of Rights ―enforced everywhere‖ and then expressed his view—the long-established 
antislavery view—that this could not be done under the 1866 Civil Rights Act, but could only be 
done with a constitutional amendment. 
34
  Bingham made it clear that he wanted an amendment 
―which would arm Congress with the power to compel obedience to the oath [to obey the 
constitution], and punish all violations by State officers of the bill of rights . . .‖ 35 
             The Supreme Court, of course, had rejected this antislavery theory and held in Prigg v. 
Pennsylvania,
36
 that the power to enforce Section IV could be implied and did so in upholding the 
fugitive slave acts.  In Wilson‘s colorful phrase, he argued that the Congress should ―turn the 
artillery of slavery upon itself‖ and use the Prigg precedent to support the cause of freedom by 
passing the Civil Rights Act and enforcing the Bill of Rights against the states. 
37
 
                                                 
31
 For a summary of this well known anti-slavery doctrine see Richard L. Aynes, On Misreading John 
Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment, 103 YALE L. J. 57, 74-78 (1993) (examining the theory and 
tracing the cases in which this theory was utilized— both successfully and unsuccessfully—from 1836 until 
right before the war in 1860).   
32
 Bingham was 51, having been born in 1815.  He had served in Congress from 1855 through 1862 and 
1865-1866, for a total of nine years as of the time of the proposal of the Amendment.  James F. Wilson was 
only 38, having been born in 1828.  He had served in Congress, as of the date of the proposal of the 
Amendment for only five years (1861-1866).  Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, 1774-
Present, available at http://bioguide.congress.gov/biosearch/biosearch.asp.  
33
 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1291 (Mar. 9, 1866) (emphasis added).  
34
 Id.   
35
 Id.  This speech was re-published in a pamphlet for mass distribution, Hon. John A. Bingham, of Ohio, 
Remarks on the Civil Rights Bill, Delivered in the House of Representatives, (Mar. 9, 1866).  (OhioLink 
search).   
36
 41 U.S. 539 (1842).  Contra, Dennison v. Kentucky, 65 U.S. 66 (1861) overruled Puerto Rico v. 
Branstad, 483 U.S. 219 (1987).   
37
 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1118 (Mar. 1, 1866).  
 7 
              Bingham‘s desire to have the Bill of Rights enforced against the states was not a secret.  
Rather, the speech was summarized in the New York Times
38
 where the Bill of Rights goal was 
spelled out.  According to Congressman William Lawrence (R-Ohio), this March 9
th
 speech of 
Bingham‘s was ―extensively published.‖39  It was also printed as a pamphlet for mass 
distribution.
40
  Of course, since it was in the Globe, the Senate knew that Bingham had expressed 
the view that the Bill of Rights should be enforced against the States. 
41
  As Wilson made clear:  
             I find in the bill of rights which the gentlemen [Bingham] wishes to  
               have enforced by an amendment to the Constitution that ‗no person shall  
               be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.‘ I  
               understand those constitute the civil rights belonging to the citizen in  
               connection with those which are necessary for the maintenance and perfect  
               enjoyment of the rights thus specially named . . . . 
42
   
Further, Wilson concluded that ―in relation to the great fundamental rights embraced in the bill of 
rights, the citizen being possessed of them is entitled to a remedy.‖ 43   
            The House agreed with Wilson and, with Bingham voting in the negative, passed the Civil 
Rights Act, 111-38
44
 and passed it again, over President Johnson‘s veto, 122-41. 45  Even 
Conservative Republican Senator James Dixon (R-Conn.), who would defect to the Democrats in 
1868, thought that the Civil Rights Act protected constitutional rights:  
                          ―Congress has given us, in the Civil Rights Act, a  
                            guarantee for free speech in every part of the Union.‖ 46 
      Thus, between 1865 and 1866 the Congress passed three sequential acts enforcing the Bill of 
Rights against the states.  Further, these same ideas were also expressed in debate over the 
preliminary version of the Fourteenth Amendment in February 1866 and the final version 
introduced on May 2, 1866.  Moreover, once the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted the 
Congress re-enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866, making this the fourth statute they had passed 
that included enforcement of the Bill of Rights against the states.  Given the oft-repeated view 
                                                 
38
 The Civil Rights Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1866 at 1.   
39
 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1837 (Apr. 7, 1866). 
40
 Hon. John A. Bingham of Ohio, On the civil rights bill: delivered in the House of Representatives (1866).  
(OhioLink search, July 9, 2008).   
41
 AMAR, supra note 5, at 1238 n. 200.  On the Senate knowing of Bingham‘s role in authoring the 
amendment, see Aynes, supra note 31, at 81 n.14 (Senator and future Vice President Henry Wilson (R-
Mass.)).  
42
 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1294 (Mar. 9, 1866).  
43
 Id. (emphasis added).  
44
 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. H.P. 1367 (Mar. 15, 1866).  
45
 Bingham was one of twenty-one abstentions.  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1861 (April 9, 1866).  
46
 Curtis, supra note 4, (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2332 (May 2, 1866)).  
 8 
that the Amendment would in some way consitutitonalize the 1866 Act, this provided double 
protection for the enforcement of the first eight amendments against the states.  
     In his speech upon an early version of the Fourteenth Amendment, Bingham noted that it was 
needed because previously ―this immortal bill of rights embodied in the Constitution, rested for 
its execution and endorsement hitherto on the fidelity of the states.‖47  The long pre-war struggle, 
the war itself, the ―Black Codes‖ that made the Civil Rights Act of 1866 necessary, and 
massacres by white police and former Confederate soldiers at Memphis and New Orleans made it 
clear that the southern states were untrustworthy and federal enforcement was an absolute 
necessity. 
48
 
          The New York Times reported the content of the speech: ―This was simply a proposition to 
arm the Congress of the United States . . . with power to enforce the Bill of Rights as it stood in 
the Constitution.‖ 49  This speech was also put into a pamphlet form.  The title page of the 
pamphlet listed Bingham‘s name, the fact that the speech was made in the House of 
Representatives, the date, and then indicated it was―[i]n support of the proposed amendment to 
enforce the Bill of Rights.‖50 
             On at least six occasions, Bingham specifically said that the Fourteenth Amendment 
would enforce the Bill of Rights against the states. 
51
  He specifically stated that the amendment 
would overturn the practical effect of Barron v. Baltimore,
52
 the Fifth Amendment case where 
John Marshall first held for a unanimous Supreme Court that the Bill of Rights did not apply 
against the states.  Further, he indicated it would overturn Livingston v. Moore,
53
 a Seventh 
Amendment case which followed Barron.  At various times in the debates he indicated that the 
                                                 
47
 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1089 (Feb. 28, 1866) (emphasis added).  
48
 The underlying facts of these events are, in some instances, discussed below. For a summary of this era 
of our history see JAMES MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM 1-233 (1988), ERIC FONER, 
RECONSTRUCTION (1988), and ERIC FONER, FOREVER FREE, THE STORY OF EMANCIPATION AND 
RECONSTRUCTION (2005).  
49
 Washington News, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1866 at 5. 
50
 AMAR, supra note 5, inside of book cover (emphasis added by underlining).  Though this speech related 
to the earlier version of the Amendment, Bingham‘s speeches make it clear this was a consistent goal.  
Also, he viewed the ultimate version of the amendment stronger than the first because it more explicitly 
limited the states and also provided enforcement power to Congress.  Curtis, supra note 27, at 948 (quoting 
CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. App. 83 (1871)).  
51
 See CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong.., 1st Sess. App. at 84 (Mar. 31, 1871); CONG. GLOBE, 39
TH
 CONG., 2d 
Sess. 811 (Jan. 28, 1867); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2541-42 (May 10, 1866); Id. at 1291-92 
(Mar. 9, 1866); Id. at 1089-90 (Feb. 28, 1866); Id. at 1034 (Feb. 26, 1866).  
52
 32 U.S. 243 (1833).  As Professor Curtis has pointed out, Senator Howard also described the effects of 
Barron, without mentioning it by name, and indicated that the Fourteenth Amendment would produce a 
different result. Curtis, supra note 4, at ___. {JCLI Draft  p. 30 n. 128(citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 
1st Sess. 2765 (May 28, 1866)).  Accord Wildenthal, supra note 4, at ___ {JCLI 128}.     
53
 32 U.S. 469 (1833).  
 9 
amendment would prevent future violations of the first, second, fourth, fifth, seventh and eight 
amendments.
54
                  
              All seem to agree that Senator Jacob Howard‘s speech in the Senate indicated that one of 
the purposes of the Amendment was to enforce the Bill of Rights against the states. 
55
   
     There is support for the statements of floor leaders Bingham and Howard in the ratification 
process, showing how the public understood it.  The message of Ohio Governor and former 
Union General, Jacob Cox, transmitting the proposed Amendment to the Ohio legislature with his 
endorsement is well known.  Cox described Section 1 as authorizing the national government ―to 
protect the citizens of the whole country in their legal privileges and immunities‖ against the 
States.  According to Cox, this provision was necessary ―long before the war, when it was 
notorious that any attempt to exercise freedom of discussion in regard to the system which was 
then hurrying on the rebellion was not tolerated.‖  Further, Governor Cox indicated that the 
necessity of having ―a reserved right to protect the freedom of the slaves whom the war 
emancipated is too palpable for argument.‖ 56  
           Indeed, one of the key beliefs of Union leaders was that the suppression of free speech had 
lead directly to the failure to abolish slavery, the rebellion, and deception to support the rebellion.  
In his July 4, 1861 message to Congress, Lincoln indicated that ―[t]here is reason to believe‖ that, 
except for South Carolina, a majority of men in every state were for the union and opposed to 
secession. 
57
  After the war, President Andrew Johnson insisted that thousands of people who 
                                                 
54
 See Aynes, supra note 31, at 70 n.72 for citations to specific speeches identifying specific constitutional 
provisions.  
55
 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2764-667 (May 23, 1866).  Some writers have tried to diminish the 
importance of Howard‘s speech or draw unsupported inferences from it. I treat those claims below.  See 
infra Section VII, B.  
56
 Ohio Executive Documents, 57th Gen. Assembly 281-282 (1867) (emphasis added).  Professor Thomas 
quotes portions of this document, Thomas, supra note ____, at {Draft 38. Still in his paper?}.  But he then 
attempts to minimize its importance by saying that enforcing the Bill of Rights ―was a knife that cuts both 
ways . . . .‖  Id.  He next cites Democratic concerns about lack of free speech in the south by former 
Confederates to criticize the reconstruction.   
There are two answers to this.  The Fourteenth Amendment would have no effect upon federal institutions 
such as the U.S. Army and the Freedmen‘s Bureau that were working the south or in areas where the writ 
of habeas corpus has been suspended.  Further, if he is correct, then this should have led the elitist white 
former slaveholders to support the Fourteenth Amendment.  We know from the actions of Democratic 
leaders like Senator Reverdy Johnson (D-Md.) and Senator Thomas A. Hendricks (D-Ind.), that this was 
not the case.  See infra note 292.  Second, Bingham made it clear that even traitors were ―persons‖ who 
would benefit from the protection of the fourteenth amendment equal protection clause, though he did note 
that in his opinion ―[t]hey ought to thank God they are permitted to live anywhere on this side of the 
deepest hell.‖  AYNES THE HISTORY OF OHIO LAW 390 (Michael Les Benedict and John F. Winkler eds.. 
year) (quoting Bingham‘s 1866 speech at Bowerston, Ohio).  
57
 Special Message to Congress, July 4, 1861, ABRAHAM LINCOLN, SPEECHES AND WRITINGS, 1859-1865 
(Don E. Fehrenbacher, ed. 1984).   
 10 
were involved in the rebellion were ―deluded, [and] deceived‖ by a small group of instigators.‖  58  
As late as 1871 Congressman Bingham told voters that he knew that ―hundreds of thousands of 
the Southern people‖ had been loyalists and gave support to the rebellion only after resistance to 
it was impossible. 
59
 
      Not surprisingly, these same views were expressed on the campaign trail and recorded in 
newspapers during the 1866 Congressional elections.  On August 6, 1866 the ―eloquent‖ speech 
of Bingham was reported in the Cincinnati Gazette and a number of other papers.
60
  In this speech 
Bingham‘s discussion of the privilege and immunities clause indicated that ―[f]reedom of 
conscience is one of the privileges of the citizen and [of] the United States‖ and that ―men are not 
to be put to torture, sent to the dungeons or made to walk the narrow steps of the scaffold for 
teaching their children the holy precepts of our Lord and Master.‖ 61  Further, Bingham invoked 
antiestablishment clause principles, affirming that ―we do not ally the church and the State . . . 
.‖62 
              Another newspaper account of an 1866 Congressional campaign speech by Bingham was 
his August 24, 1866 speech in Bowerstown, Ohio.  This speech was published in the Cincinnati 
Commercial and republished in its book Speeches of the Campaign of 1861 in Ohio, Indiana, and 
Kentucky.
63
  The headline in the Commercial was ―The Constitutional Amendment Discussed by 
its Author.‖  In his discussion of the Amendment Bingham indicated that it ―imposed a limitation 
on the States to correct their abuses of power‖ and was ―essential to the nation‘s life.‖  Bingham 
                                                 
58
 Aynes, supra note 56, at 373.  
59
 One of the ways in which this makes sense is that even Unionists—or maybe especially Unionists—were 
drafted into the Confederate Army.  A common strategy was to assign them to some unit away from the 
home to prevent them from deserting and denying them support from their families.  Examples of this are 
provided A.W. BISHOP, LOYALTY ON THE FRONTIER OR SKETCHES OF UNION MEN IN THE SOUTHWEST 128-
131 (1863) (one example  involved the arrest of  77  Unionists who were marched in chains to Little Rock 
and given the choice of being hung or serving in the rebel army; only ten were still living by the time of  
the Battle of Shiloh and these men were all placed in the front lines because they were considered 
unreliable; all but two were killed during the battle and one of those who survived was wounded; he 
eventually was able to escape into Union lines and enlisted in the First Arkansas Cavalry, a Union 
Regiment).  Over 100,000 white Union soldiers came from southern states.  RICHARD N. CURRENT, 
LINCOLN‘S LOYALISTS 218 (1992) (giving an account of prior estimates and how he arrived at this figure).   
60
 Cadiz (Ohio) Republican, Aug.16, 1866, indicating that the original speech was reported in the 
Cincinnati Gazette and was being reprinted in the Republican.  See also Cincinnati Daily Commercial, 
Aug. 10, 1866 at 1 quoted in Gerald N. Magliocca, Indians and Invaders; The Citizenship Clause and 
Illegal Aliens, 10 J. OF CONSTITUTIONAL  LAW 499, 518 n.92 (2008) which seems to be quoting this same 
speech.   
61
 Id.  
62
 Id.   
63
 [hereinafter CAMPAIGN SPEECHES].  The book was published by the Cincinnati Commercial in 1866.  It 
was obviously published after the election because the last portion of the book gives the results of the 
election.  But this means that the book may still have played a role in the ratification of the Amendment.  
Of course, the original articles played a role in the Congressional elections of 1866.    
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declared the adoption of the Amendment ―essential‖ to the peace and safety of the Republican.  In 
part of his discussion he indicated that the state would no longer be able to ―take away freedom of 
speech‖ or imprison people for ―teaching their fellow man that there is a hereafter, and a reward 
for those who learn to do well.‖ 64  After discussing other portions of the Amendment, Bingham 
closed by asking not just his constituents, but the ―American people‖ to ―place in the Constitution 
of the country that covenant  of equal and exact justice . . . which will make the Republic 
perpetual.‖ 65   
        Bingham was not the only Congressman to speak to the electorate about the meaning of the 
Amendment.  On August 28, 1866 Congressman Columbus Delano (R-Ohio) gave an extended 
speech at Coshocton, Ohio.
66
  In a section of the news report titled ―The Amendment—Clause 
First,‖ Delano noted that it defined citizenship, which ―provides that the privileges and 
immunities‖ of citizens ―shall not be destroyed or impaired‖ by the states, and provided for due 
process of law. 
67
 
In explaining what this meant Delano proceeded:  
 
                       I know very well that the citizens of the South and of the North going  
                         South have not hitherto been safe in the South for want of constitutional  
                         power in Congress to protect them.  I know that white men have for a  
                         series of years been driven out of the South, when their opinions did not  
                         concur with the ‗chivalry‘ of the Southern slaveholders.  I know that you  
                         remember when an able lawyer from Massachusetts was expelled from  
                         South Carolina by a Southern mob.  And I know that we determined  
                         these privileges and immunities of citizenship by this amendment of the  
                         Constitution ought to be protected, and I know you have lost your reason,  
                                                 
64
 The latter statement is undoubtedly, as Professor Gerald N. Magliocca has suggested, a reference to 
Georgia‘s draconian statutes that applied to Missionaries to the Cherokee Indians before their removal from 
Georgia.  Magliocca, supra note 60, at 518.  A slightly different version urged Tennessee to ratify the 
fourteenth amendment and every southern state to follow suit:  ―Then, hereafter, in Georgia, men shall not 
be imprisoned, as in the past, for teaching the lowly to read in the New Testament of another and a better 
life.‖ Id. at fn. 92.  Again, one must ask, how could this be prevented without the enforcement of the Bill of 
Rights against Georgia?  
65
 CAMPAIGN SPEECHES, supra note 63, at 19 (Bingham: Bowerstown speech).  
66
  CAMPAIGN SPEECHES, supra note 63, at 23.  This speech was reported by a correspondent of the 
Cincinnati Commercial and no doubt published originally in the Commercial.  It seems probable that the 
speech was re-published at least in the newspapers of Delano‘s own 13th Congressional District.  Delano 
served as a Whig (1845-1847) and Republican (1865-69) in Congress and as the U.S. Secretary of the 
Interior (1870-1875).   
67
 Delano made no mention of the equal protection clause.  Id. 
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                         every man of you, who denies the propriety of their protection. [Applause.]‖68 
Delano‘s clear statement that the amendment would protect ―citizens of the South and of the 
North going South‖ demonstrates that he did not view the amendment as a mere ―equality‖ or 
―non-discrimination‖ provision, but rather one that provided substantive rights.  Read fairly, this 
speech indicates that there was to be a substantive right of free discussion for all in the South and 
that mobbing and banishment was to be prevented.  
           General Rutherford B. Hayes, war hero,
69
 Congressman and future President of the United 
States, made a public speech at the Cincinnati City Hall on September 7, 1866. 
70
  Hayes began 
his speech by noting there were only two plans of reconstruction: The Union Plan, which 
followed the policy of Lincoln, and the ―rebel plan.‖ 71  As Hayes outlined it, ―the Union men of 
the country‖ had beliefs which included that African Americans were entitled to ―freedom, and 
protection in the full enjoyment of the inalienable rights of man.‖ 72 
                     Hayes summarized the ―rebel‖ plan as follows:  
                                  Loyal white men and loyal [Black] men are to be protected  
                                    alone in those States by State laws, executed {?} by State  
                                    authorities, as if they were loyal States. 
73
 { ? = same as on p. 11} I was not 
able to verify this quote with the copy of Campaign Speeches I found.  It did not include page 28. 
Hayes insisted that such a plan was ―wrong in principle, wrong in its details, and finally wrong as 
a precedent and example for the future.‖ 74  He insisted that only the constitutional amendment 
could protect the loyalists of the south.  Hayes said that ―no Union man‖ can object to the 
Amendment because the terms are ―few in number, easily understood, and manifestly just.‖ 75 
                                                 
68
 Id. at col. 3.  The italicized emphasis was in the original. The underlined emphasis was added by the 
author.  
69
 Hayes commanded soldiers in mostly what were considered smaller battles but did so with success.  He 
was wounded twice and injured a third time when his horse what shot out from under him.  Though he 
acceded in his nomination to Congress, he refused to leave the battlefield until the fighting was over. See 
HANS L. TREFOUSSE, RUTHERFORD B. HAYES 21-38 (2002). Grant noted in his memoirs that Hayes‘ 
―conduct on the field was marked by conspicuous gallantry as well as the display of qualities of a higher 
order than that of mere personal daring.‖  ULYSSES S. GRANT, PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U.S. GRANT 480 
(2001 reprint).   
70
 ―The Questions of the Day,‖ CAMPAIGN SPEECHES, supra note 63, at 28.   
71
 Id. at col. 1.  
72
 Id.   
73
 Id. (emphasis added).  
74
 In this regard, Congressman Hayes‘ views seem to be consistent with Madison‘s idea of ―double 
security.‖  See infra note 202.  This concern about the unreliability of the state is articulated by Bingham‘s 
view that one reason for the need for the Fourteenth Amendment was to put the guarantee of rights into the 
Constitution ―thus placing [them] above the power of South Carolina to repeal [them].‖  Curtis, supra note 
27, at 925 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 123 (Dec. 21, 1866)).  
75
 Id.  One of the goals that Hayes indicated the Amendment was designed to achieve was to remove ―every 
relic of slavery from the Federal Constitution and from the constitutions and laws of all the States.‖ Id.  
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              Judiciary Chair James Wilson‘s (R-Iowa) articulated the need for Fourteenth 
Amendment protection of citizens in a campaign speech in September 1866:  
                   We must still guarantee . . . the liberty of going into any part of the  
                    United States and causing their type to speak as freely as when our  
                    Army was there. . . . [The boys who fought the war] must have the  
                    same liberty of speech in any part of the South as they always have  
                    had in the North . . . .  
76
 
              These views are very similar to those of the ―call‖ for the Convention of Southern 
loyalists that took place in Philadelphia which Professor Curtis has documented. 
77
  Curtis 
indicates that the ―call‖ for the convention was circulated in writing and then again read at the 
Convention when it met in September of 1866:   
                                      The majority in Congress, and its supporters, firmly  
                                       declare that ‗the rights of the citizen enumerated in the Constitution,  
                                       and established by the supreme law, must be maintained inviolate.  
                                       Rebels and Rebel sympathizers assert that ‗the right of 
                                       the citizens must be left to the States alone, and under  
                                       such regulations as the respective States choose  
                                       voluntarily to prescribe.‘ 78 
 According to Curtis:  
                         the loyalists‘ Appeal of the Loyal Men of the South to Their  
                          Fellow Citizens was widely reprinted in the Republican press.  
                          It reflected the loyalists‘ understanding that free speech rights  
                          were among the rights of citizens of the United States that states  
                           must respect.  It said that ‗seeds of oligarchy [were] planted in  
                           the constitution by its slavery feature‘ and had produced 
                           monstrous results . . . . Statute books groaned under despotic  
                           laws against unlawful and insurrectionary assemblies aimed at the  
                           constitutional guarantees of the right to peaceably assemble and 
                           petition for redress of grievances; it proscribed democratic 
                           literature as incendiary; it nullified constitutional guarantees of  
                                                 
76
 MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE  253 (1986) (citing Burlington (Iowa) Hawk Eye, 
Sept. 13, 1866, at 1, col. 2).   In this same speech Wilson argues that the former slaveholders should not be 
compensated for the loss of slaves.  
77 Michael Kent Curtis, Historical Linguistics, Inkblots, and Life after Death: the privileges or immunities 
of citizens of the United States, 78 N. C. L. REV. 1071, 1134-35 (2000).  
78
 Id. (emphasis added).  
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                           freedom of free speech and a free press; it deprived citizens of  
                           the other States of their privileges and immunities in the States . . . . 
79
 
               On August 30, 1866 the North American (Pa.) responded to the question of what 
constituted one‘s privileges or immunities under the amendment:  
                   The privileges and immunities . . . are those of not having your private  
                      letters opened and read by emissaries of the oligarchy . . . ; of not having  
                      your political sentiments regulated by the same absolute authority; of not  
                      being beaten, maimed, murdered or driven away from exercising freedom of  
                      speech or the press; of holding meetings or conversations for lawful  
                      purposes; the privilege of looking after your property in your own way;  
                      of collecting your debts by lawful means. . . ; of organizing your political  
                      party and voting your own ticket without intimidation or molestation.‖ 80 
                  There were other public speeches that corroborate the nationalization of protection.     
General, Congressman, and future President James A. Garfield (R-Ohio) spoke at the convention 
in Toledo that re-nominated Congressman Ashley (R-Ohio) for his fifth term in Congress.  
Among other matters, Garfield affirmed that the amendment would protect ―individual rights.‖ 81  
Garfield indicated Congress passed the Civil Rights Act because ―the courts of the South do not 
recognize these men as having any civil rights . . . .‖ 82  In rejecting President Johnson‘s claim 
that ―the great law of supply and demand‖ would protect African Americans, Garfield made it 
clear that the type of protection in which he, Garfield, was advocating and what would be 
provided by the Fourteenth Amendment was the protection of ―personal liberty‖ and ―individual 
rights.‖ 83 
                                                 
79
 Id.  
80
 North American (Pa.) Aug. 30, 1866, at 2, col. 3 quoted in Curtis, supra note 76, at 144, who in turn 
quoted from James Bond, The Original Understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment in Illinois, Ohio, and 
Pennsylvania,‖ 18 AKRON L. REV.  435 (1985).  Professor Curtis indicates that Bond concluded that this 
provision supports ―selective incorporation.‖  The fallacy of Bond‘s logic is discussed below in section 
VIII.   
81
 This is consistent with and reinforced by knowledge of Garfield‘s speech upon the floor of Congress 
where he indicated that personal rights and liberties must be ―in the keeping of the nation‖ and that rights 
relating to life, liberty and property could ―no longer [be] left to the caprice of mobs or the contingencies of 
local legislation.‖ Curtis, supra note 27, at 945 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong.,1st Sess. 1757 (April 4, 
1866)) .  Only by invoking federal authority, could one prevent the evils against which the amendment was 
designed.  Indeed, Garfield‘s position is the same as that articulated by John N. Pomeroy in 1868. See infra 
notes 230-243 and accompanying text.  
82
 Id.  
83
 Id. General George W. Morgan, the unsuccessful Democratic candidate for Ohio Governor in 1865, 
endorsed President Johnson‘s plan and paraphrased it as ―[l]et [the Freedman] rely on himself and his 
former master for protection.‖  CAMPAIGN SPEECHES, supra note 63, at 16, col. 3 (emphasis added).  
 15 
            In reference to Section 4, Garfield indicated that if the Democrats won control of the 
government they would repudiate the federal war debt. 
84
  In the remaining portion of that 
sentence Garfield said: ―[N]ot only so, but all that has been gained substantially in the war would 
be lost.  Let that party triumph this fall, and Union men can not stay any longer in the South.‖ 85  
According to Garfield, the ―scenes of the New Orleans‖ massacre would be ―re-enacted in every 
city of south.  Our friends who were once soldiers, and who are now settled there, are already 
being told to leave . . . .‖ 86 
            Garfield expressed regret that the audience could not hear from ―that able man who has 
suffered in the South, Governor [Andrew Jackson] Hamilton‖ about whom Michael Kent Curtis 
had written for so long. 
87
 ―[Hamilton] said that he could not live in Texas but for the great Union 
party at the North . . . .‖ 88 
                 Garfield noted that President Johnson argued that the white slaveholder had to be 
admitted to Congress because the U.S. did not believe in taxation without representation, to 
which Garfield replied:  
                 Then, why do you refuse representation to four millions of [N]egroes? 
                    Yet you and your party deny their right to representation but claim your  
                    right to tax them to the very utmost.  [Loud applause.] 
89
 
In other ways Garfield met the racial issue head on:  
                    I had ten thousand times rather take by the hand a [B]lack man who is loyal than the  
                      whitest-skinned man on earth who is a traitor to my country.  [Loud applause.] 
90
 
Ashley was renominated by acclamation and the platform adopted made it clear that the 
convention  endorsed the Amendment. 
91
  The platform also made it clear that the spirit of slavery 
was not dead and that new protections were necessary:  
                    Resolved, That in the recent butchery of loyal Union citizens of the United  
                     States, throughout the South, and especially in New Orleans, we recognize  
                     the same old spirit of despotism, cruelty and injustice, . . . and we believe, if  
                     these horrible massacres of peaceful and unoffending citizens, by rebels, are  
                                                 
84
 Id.  
85
 Id.  
86
 Id.  
87
 Id. Professor Curtis first called our attention to Governor Hamilton in 1986. Curtis, supra note 76,  at 
133-134 and 137.  
88
 Id.  
89
 Id.  
90
 Id. Garfield stated that the Democrats ―hate‖ the Black man not because of the color of his skin, but 
because he was loyal while they were disloyal. 
91
 Id. at col. 2.  
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                     continued, that another civil war is inevitable. 
92
 
                   In addition, Congressman, Senator and future Secretary of Treasury, John Sherman 
(R-Ohio), stated that the nation was ―bound by every obligation . . . to protect [African 
Americans] in all their natural rights.‖ 93  To this, the reporter indicated the audience responded 
with ―tremendous applause.‖ 94  Sherman further indicated that Congress ―demanded protection to 
every loyal man . . . .‖  
         Professor Thomas expressed surprise to find racist articles in Maryland,
95
 and in his final 
paper broadens this to other northern states. 
96
  But it is well known that Democratic efforts in the 
                                                 
92
 Id. (emphasis in original).  
93
 CINCINNATI COMMERCIAL, Sept. 29, 1866 at 39.   
94
 Id.  
95
 Professor Thomas quotes the vituperative language of the 1868 Democratic Platform, without much 
pause over the fact that the Democrats lost that race, by over 300,000 votes, with the Republican receiving 
52.7% of the popular vote.  The Democrats only carried eight of the thirty-three states:  Delaware, Georgia, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, and Oregon.  Five of the eight states were slave 
states until the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment in 1865.  They lost the electoral vote 
overwhelmingly: 214-80.  By utilizing the popular vote and ignoring the distribution that produced the 
electoral vote, he concludes that the Democratic campaign ―was not a colossal failure.‖  Thomas, supra 
note ___, at ___ {JCLI Draft p. 25}.  But this anachronistic.  The Democrats did not see it that way.  
Indeed, though the Horace Greely debacle of 1872 produced the lowest percentage vote for a Democratic 
candidate (43%) between 1860 –1892, WILLIAM GILLETTE, RETREAT FROM RECONSTRUCTION 71 (1979), 
Seymour‘s 1868 percentage of 47% was not significantly above it. Gillette termed both the 1868 and the 
1872 elections ―catastrophic.‖ Id.; see also FONER, supra note 48, at 267 (referring to the 1866 
Congressional elections as ―a disastrous defeat‖). [more than one Foner source is cited at fn. 48]. 
 
The losses in the Congressional elections of 1866 and the Presidential election of 1868 were so devastating 
that some Democrats realized if they held to that platform they would never again prevail in a national 
election. This caused them to abandon their 1868 platform and announce what was termed the ―New 
Departure.‖  ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION 1863-1877  412 (1988) (―The advocates of a New Departure 
argued that their party could only return to power by putting the issues of Civil War and Reconstruction 
behind them.‖).  
While there is no dispute that the Democrats who used a racist approach to campaigning existed in 
all states,  it should be noted that they were in the minority in four of the seven so-called  ―sympathetic 
border states‖ named , Thomas supra note __, at ____ {JCLI  Draft p. 23.}, with Indiana, Missouri, Ohio, 
and Kansas having voted Republican in the 1868 election.  
 
This misperception about the extent of the influence of the racists within the Democratic party and the 
party‘s minority status is illustrative of the context that is missing from much of the article.  Without 
intending to be exclusive, four more examples stand out:  
1. There is a continuing reference to ―Radical Republicans‖ Thomas, supra note ___, at __  {JCLI 
Draft at . 23, 25,  44, 45), as if they controlled Congress and/or wrote the Fourteenth Amendment 
when, in fact, Congress and the content of the Amendment were controlled by the moderates and 
not the radicals.  Even the conservative New York Times considered the Amendment to be a 
moderate proposal which would unite all elements of the Republican majority.  FONER, supra note 
__, at 260; Aynes, supra note 56,  at 385-386 and sources cited therein; and Bryan Wildenthal, 
Nationalizing the Bill of Rights: Revisiting the Original Understanding of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in 1866–67, 68 OHIO ST. L. J. 1509, 1559 (2007) (on support of Johnson‘s veto of the 
Civil Rights Act).  
2. Professor Thomas refers to ―[t]he South‖ having ―rejected the Fourteenth Amendment.‖  
 17 
election of 1866 included the ―most vicious race baiting in all of American History.‖ 97  They 
―employed mean-spirited and vicious rhetoric to appeal to voters‘ basest prejudices and fears.‖98  
Northern Democrats as well as Southern ones thought—as they had in past elections—that the 
society was so racist that the Democrats would win running against African Americans.  They 
were wrong.  They pursued that strategy and lost overwhelmingly, reversing the trend where the 
majority party loses ―off-year‖ elections.99  The Nation concluded that the Republican victory was 
―the most decisive and emphatic victory ever seen in American politics.‖ 100 
                  One example of the losing Democratic approach is found in the speech of former anti-
war Congressman Clement L. Vallandigham (D-Ohio). 
101
  A key claim of Vallandigham was that 
the Civil Rights Bill could not rightly be enacted by either Congress or a state legislature and that 
its ―fixed purpose‖ was to ―obliterate all distinctions on account of color and thus literally to 
prepare the way for making this not a white man‘s government, but a government of [N]egroes, 
or a mixed government.‖  Under the title ―The Constitutional amendment‖ Vallandigham focused 
upon the citizenship clause, the privileges or immunities clause, and the enforcement clause.  
                     The articulated concern was that, when combined, these constitutional clauses would 
overcome the state constitution of Ohio, which limited the right to vote to white citizens.
102
  
                                                                                                                                                 
       Thomas, supra note ____, at ___  {JCLI draft at 23}.  Though he does not clearly state this, what  
        he is referring to is the Andrew Johnson all-white minority governments (replacing the loyal  
        Lincoln governments) which followed Johnson‘s lead in rejecting the Amendment.    
        As soon as the Congress organized more democratic governments that allowed the majority of   
        males to vote in Southern States, those more democratic governments ratified the Amendment.      
        In this context Thomas is defining ―South‖  to count only the former slaveholders, the prior 
         oligarchy, and those formerly in rebellion,  Thomas excludes from the term ―southerner‖  the 
        over 100,000 white southern soldiers who fought for the Union Army, the over 200,000 African  
        Americans soldiers who fought for the Union, and many others who were loyal but did not engage  
        in the war. Functionally, he defines ―the South‖ as  the white  anti-Republican minority  and 
        excludes all others no matter where they were born, resided or held citizenship.    
3. There is no demonstration of familiarly with the anti-slavery legal theory (1834-1865) and 
Republican ideology that would place some of the articles he discounts into context.  In many 
instances, this familiarity would change the conclusion  reached about the meaning of the  
newspaper articles.   
4. The claim that the equal protection clause ―was probably understood‖ to mean that ―a prosecutor 
could not use peremptory challenges to exclude [B]lacks from jury service,‖ Thomas, supra note 
___, at ___{JCLI 30}, seems particularly anachronistic. 
96
 Thomas, supra note __, at 28.  
97
  ROBERT D. SAWREY, DUBIOUS VICTORY 4 (1992).     
98
  Id. at 6.  
99
 FONER, supra note ___, at 267.  [Foner is cited more than once, each referring to different sources.  I 
cannot tell which Foner cite fn. 99 and 100 refer to.  See fn. 48.] 
100
 FONER, supra note ___, at 268 (citing Nation, Nov.15, 1866).   
101
 CAMPAIGN SPEECHES, supra note 63, at 42 col. 2.  
102
 Id.  Though Vallandigham does not explicitly equate voting with citizenship and, indeed, by the 
discussion of Section 2 later may not be making that claim, the speech is imprecise enough that one cannot 
tell whether the objection is to African American citizenship or voting or both.  He does claim that the 
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Claiming that the state constitutions of Indiana, Illinois, and ―nearly‖ every Northwestern state 
contained provisions ―against [N]egro suffrage, against [N]egro equality,‖103 Vallandigham 
argued that the enforcement clause was designed so that ―no State shall be allowed to enforce the 
provisions of its own Constitutions.‖104  
          Immediately after the quoted section, Vallandigham quoted, verbatim, the privileges, or 
immunities, clause of the Amendment and then stated this conclusion:  
                       So, henceforward, it is not to belong to the State authorities to  
                         determine any question that shall, in the judgment of Congress, or  
                         the courts of the United States, abridge the immunities or privileges of  
                         the [African American] population, not of the South only, but of the  
                         Northwest also.
105
   
A speaker who spoke against Congressman Delano (R-Ohio) was the unsuccessful Democratic 
candidate for Governor of Ohio, General George W. Morgan.  Morgan had a mixed war record, 
having resigned from the Army in June 1863 because he was not viewed well by his commander, 
General William T. Sherman, and because Morgan opposed the abolition of slavery.
106
 
Morgan‘s key concern with the Amendment was that because it defined citizenship and took 
away from the states the right to determine who would be citizens, it was ―another bold stride 
toward a central despotism.‖ 107  Morgan concluded that if the federal government had the right to 
define who were citizens, ―it would be at once claimed that [the Federal Government] also had 
the right to define the rights of such citizens . . . .‖ 108  The problem with that, according to 
Morgan, was ―we should soon have [N]egro jurors, voters, judges, and legislators in Ohio, by 
virtue of laws of Congress.‖ 109 
         After quoting a portion of Section 2, Morgan indicated that ―[t]he object of the amendment, 
then, is to create [N]egro judges, jurors and legislators, and, if you refuse to make [N]egros your 
                                                                                                                                                 
Amendment‘s definition of state citizenship was a violation of ―a fundamental principle of our Federal 
system‖ that the state defined citizenship.  Id.  Of course, prior to the war the Democrats denied that the 
state had the right to define state citizenship to include African Americans.  
103
 Id.   
104
 Id.  
105
 Id.  This view would, of course, be consistent with enforcing the Bill of Rights against the states. 
Keeping his focus upon race, Vallandigham proceeded to object to Section 2 which might result in African-
American voting rights.  One might wonder why this speaker or any Democratic speaker would talk about 
something as politically insignificant or complicated as the grand jury or the right against self-
incrimination, when they thought they could win with a straightforward racist appeal?  
106
 STEWART SIFAKIS, WHO WAS WHO IN HE CIVIL WAR 456 (1988).  He also supported McClellan against 
Lincoln in the 1864 Presidential election.  Id. 
107
 CAMPAIGN SPEECHES, supra note 63, at 16, col. 1.  
108
 Id.  
109
 Id.  
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political equals, then you are to be partially  disfranchised.  [Applause.]‖  At that point, Morgan 
invited the people in the audience who favored this to vote for Delano ―and if elected he will aid 
you in placing yourselves, your wives, sons and daughters, on a level with the  [N]egroes.‖110  
 Morgan also campaigned against ―Negro Suffrage‖ in the District of Columbia, the wool 
tariff, domination (―vassalage‖) by New England,111 and, to the soldiers, claimed that ―you 
languished in prison because [Secretary of War] Edwin M. Stanton thought more of the [N]egro 
than he did of you . . . .‖ 112  
Continuing his appeal to irrational racism, Morgan pounded Delano‘s record:  
                     Columbus Delano voted to establish [N]egro equality at the National Capital  
                     [by voting for suffrage].  Nor is this all.  He voted for a similar bill to establish  
                     [N]egro suffrage in the Territories [and] voted for the Civil Rights Bill, thereby  
                     creating the right of [N]egroes to sit on juries, even in violation of the  
                     Constitution and laws of any, or every State. 
113
  
The core of his views was:  
                       These men, who claim to be your leaders, assert that the [N]egro is the  
                       equal of the white man. . . .  Can you then, consistently with your own  
                       self-respect, support the men who have sought to betray—yes, and degrade 
                       you?  [Applause.] 
114
 
                                                 
110
 Id.  Note the focus upon female relatives and the avoidance of any mention of male relatives.  
111
 Id.  Morgan claimed Ohio was ―ruled by New England!‖  He said that Senators—he meant all members 
of Congress—who were originally from New England brought those ideas to other states and included 
Columbus Delano (R-Ohio), Thaddeus Stevens (R-Pa.), Benjamin Wade (R-Ohio), and Judge Trumbull (R-
Ill.).  He urged the men of Ohio to ―break the shackles which the schemers of New England have thrown 
around us.‖ Id.  
112
 The policy of refusing to exchange prisoners of war unless the Confederate states included African 
American Union Soldiers was a policy of U.S. Grant.  JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM, 
THE CIVIL WAR ERA 793 (1988) (―No distinction whatever will be made in the exchange between white 
and [Black] prisoners.‖).  Morgan lacked the courage to name him because he was so popular and named 
Secretary of War Stanton, instead.  Of course, the real fault was with the Confederate States who refused to 
treat African Americans as soldiers.    
113
 Id. at col. 3.  
114
 Id.  Morgan tried to link his view to that of Henry Clay, Daniel Webster, and Abraham Lincoln.  
Professor Thomas takes the Democratic Platform of 1868 at its modern word when it claimed in 1868 it 
wants to right to avoid ―centralization‖ and ―consolidated government.‖  Thomas, supra note ___ {JCLI at 
25. }.  
In summarizing the 1868 Democratic Convention a leading historian of the times says: ―[I]t was abusive in 
tone, intolerant in feeling, imprudent in its reconstruction plank, contradictory in economic policy, and 
impolitic in its nominations.  The party thus guaranteed that it would be unsatisfactory to the moderate 
conservative voter, would alienate unionist Democrats, and would antagonize Republicans.‖  WILLIAM 
GILLETTE, RETREAT FROM RECONSTRUCTION 14 (1979).  The 1866 speeches of former Congressman 
Vallandigham and General Morgan show what Democrats wanted was the ―state‘s right‖ to continue to 
completely control the emancipated slave and the unionist in the borders of their states.  They wanted to be 
able to deal with the almost 1,000 murders that General Sheridan said took place in Texas in the usual way: 
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However, while these racist appeals may have increased the Democratic vote, they were 
ultimately unsuccessful in winning the Congressional elections of 1866 or the Presidential 
election of 1868.  
             Once the amendment was ratified in 1868, until approximately 1873, there was near 
universal agreement that the Bill of Rights could be enforced against the states.  We see this in 
the work of Robert Kaczorowski who documents that this was the view of the prosecutors who 
brought cases for violations of the enforcement statutes under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
115
 
Indeed, as Cruikshank illustrates, we see this in the view of heroic prosecutors at least up until 
1876. 
116
  This agreement was also shown in many of the early cases decided under the 
Fourteenth Amendment in the lower Courts before 1873 and in the positions taken by various 
Justices of the Supreme Court on the Circuit or in private correspondence. 
117
 
                                                                                                                                                 
to prosecute no one for the murder of a unionists or African American.  They wanted to deal with the 
African Americans by the ―Black codes‖ which made African Americans virtual slaves of the state.  They 
wanted to deal with the terrorist assaults upon white and Black Republicans, like those of Memphis and 
New Orleans, as they had always done: give them tacit approval, refuse to protect the victims, and to refuse 
to prosecute the terrorists.  So the terrorists and their political allies were indignant.  Why does that surprise 
anyone and why do we care?  
115
 This was also the view of the U.S. Attorneys‘ office and key decisions of the lower federal courts.  
ROBERT J. KACZOROWKI, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE FEDERAL COURTS, 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1866-1876 (1985);  Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary 
Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N. Y. U. L. REV. 863 (1986); 
U.S. v. Hall, 26 F. Cas. 79 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871) (No. 15,282 ); U.S. v. Mall, 26 F.Cas. 1147 (S.D. Ala. 
1871) (No. 15,712).  It is unclear whether Hall and Mall are the same case or two separate cases. See 
Aynes, supra note 31, at 98 n.262.   
     In his decision upon the Circuit in the Slaughterhouse Cases, Justice Joseph Bradley indicated that 
police regulations ―cannot [interfere with liberty of conscience, or with the entire equality of all creeds and 
religions before the law.  Nor can they] . . . interfere with the fundamental privileges and immunities of 
American citizens.‖  Live-Stock Dealers‘ & Butchers' Ass'n v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing & 
Slaughter-House Co., 15 F. Cas. 649, 652 (C.C.D. La. 1870) (No. 8,408).  Further, in his dissent in the 
Supreme Court, Bradley specifically listed trial by jury, free exercise of religious worship, free speech, free 
press, the right of assembly, the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, and due process as 
privileges and immunities.  The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 118 (1873) (Bradley, J., dissenting); 
Aynes, supra note 9, at 1257 n.397.  The privileges and immunities were not limited to the Bill of Rights.  
Earl Maltz, The Fourteenth Amendment as Political Compromise—Section One in the Joint Committee on 
Reconstruction, 45 OHIO ST. L. J. 934, 966-67, 970 (1984).  
116
 United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).  
117
 See Richard L. Aynes, Constricting the Law of Freedom: Justice Miller, the Fourteenth Amendment, 
and the Slaughter-House Cases, 70 CHI-KENT L. REV. 627, 671 (1994). (quoting a letter in which Field 
indicated that the amendment approved by Congress ―appears to me to be just what we needed.‖);   I THE 
SALMON P. CHASE PAPERS, JOURNALS, 1829-1872 (John Nevin ed., 1993) (Diary entry of Justice Chase 
about his conversation with southern leaders urging them to make support of the Fourteenth Amendment 
the platform for the 1866 elections; entries of Wednesday, Sept. 5, 1866 at 632 and Monday, Sept. 24, 1866 
at 640).   
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     In addition, this was the unanimous view of the only three legal treatises published between 
1866 and 1868 which also commented upon the effect of the pending amendment. 
118
  In addition, 
                                                 
118
  JUDGE TIMOTHY FARRAR, MANUAL OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (1867); 
JUDGE GEORGE W. PASCHAL,  THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES DEFINED AND CAREFULLY 
ANNOTATED (1868); DEAN JOHN NORTON POMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF 
THE UNITED STATES (1868).  
For an analysis of the text of these works and the status of their authors, see Aynes, supra note 31, at 83-94.  
There were at least four other treatises published in 1867 or 1868 which did not acknowledge the pending 
amendment or comment upon its effect if adopted.  Those treatises were WILLIAM WEDGEWOOD, THE 
GOVERNMENT AND LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES(1867); GEORGE COMSTOCK, COMMENTARIES ON 
AMERICAN LAW BY JAMES KENT (11th ed. 1867); WILLIAM ALEXANDER DUER, A COURSE OF LECTURES 
ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES (1868); and THOMAS M. COOLEY, 
TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE 
STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION (1868). 
 
Professor Wildenthal and Professor Dripps would add an examination of treatises by JOEL E. BISHOP, 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1866) and FRANCIS WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW (1868).  When I first started 
examining treatises, I was focused upon those that addressed Constitutional Law and would not have 
looked either of these treatises.  That is not a reason to disqualify them, simply an explanation of my own 
past research.  We can examine treatises in the ratification period for multiple purposes, but I will have to 
defer that pleasure to the future. 
      There is some dispute over the importance of Cooley in determining the meaning of the amendment. 
Professor Wildenthal agrees with my conclusion that Cooley‘s 1868 treatise did not mention the Fourteenth 
Amendment and that therefore it cannot help us in knowing what, if any, contemporaneous opinions 
Cooley may have had about the adoption of the amendment or its goals.  He does suggest that I have mis-
read Cooley‘s 1871 treatise.  Wildenthal, supra note 4, at {Pre. Conference draft at 20 }.  I will try to 
return to this point in the future.  But for now I would suggest that given the need to look at 
contemporaneous (pre-ratification) statements the only reason to look at the 1871 treatise is because 
Charles Fairman cited it (along with the 1868 and 1873 treatises) for the ―want of knowledge‖ of 
incorporation by Cooley.  CHARLES FAIRMAN, MR. JUSTICE MILLER AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1862-1890 
116 (1939).    Though I may not have articulated this clearly in 1993, sixteen years later it appears to me 
that an examination of the 1871 treatise is important for two reasons.  First, it helps test Fairman‘s 
scholarship.  Second, if, as I think is the case, Cooley‘s 1871 has some ambiguity in it, it helps to 
understand that he went from silence in 1868 to ambiguity in 1871 to clarity in 1873.   
         In addition to reading his article, Professor Rosenthal and I have exchanged some views about the 
importance of Cooley over the last year.  Where it appears we disagree, is on the time in which Cooley‘s 
views would be relevant for determining the intent, meaning, or public understanding of the Amendment. 
Though I may well return to this issue for a fuller discussion at some time in the future, for now, my views 
and questions are:  
1. The relevant time for Cooley to express his views on the effect of the Fourteenth Amendment 
generally ends with its adoption in July 1868.  As far as I can tell, Cooley expressed no  
opinion prior to that time.   
2. Do we know, from any source, what Cooley‘s personal view was on whether the Amendment 
should be adopted or not?  Did he support the adoption of the amendment like Chief Justice 
Salmon P. Chase and Justice Stephen Field?  Did he endorse the anti-fourteenth amendment 
sponsored by President Johnson like Justice Miller?  Or did he stay silent in 1866-1867? 
3. Cooley was a Republican when elected to the Michigan Supreme Court in 1864.  By 1887 he had 
become a Democrat.  When did he abandon the Republican party and why? 
4. At some point Cooley became a person with a national reputation within the legal profession.  
Based upon some preliminary research, my own hypothesis is that Cooley was not well known in 
1866-1868 and that he attained the national reputation attributed to him only in the 1880s.  Is 
there any evidence to the contrary? 
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at least by the early 1870s, the application of the Bill of Rights to the state was accepted by the 
Democrats.
119
   
III. 
The need for contemporaneous statements on understanding/intent: Pre-1866-1868 
             The relevant period of inquiry is primarily the events leading up to the proposal of the 
amendment (the relevant history and the evils against which it was thought to cure), and the 
public debates both before and during ratification.  With rare exception, post-ratification 
statements are of little or no weight and Professor Wildenthal has outlined some of the reasons 
that post-ratification events are to be taken with some caution.  Those cautions apply with much 
stronger force to the Fourteenth Amendment because of the ―reactionary‖ movement that took 
place after the adoption of the amendment.  The analysis below explains some of the reasons for 
the significant changes in public opinion and how those changes should be taken into account.  
A. 
Changes wrought by politics and economics 
     A detailed examination of the Reconstruction era is beyond the scope of this article, but 
everyone who has studied the period recognizes that a profound change took place. 
120
  We know 
that we can document changes in leading political leaders, and indeed, the country, as early as 
1871. 
121
  Indeed, by September of 1871 Horace Greeley, one of the national leaders of the 
Republican Party, was publicly opposed to the re-nomination of Ulysses S. Grant as President.   
Then in May of 1872, Greeley accepted the nomination of the Liberal Republicans and the 
Democrats for President. 
122
  Among the noted Republicans deserting their Party and joining with 
their former enemies was Charles Sumner (R- Mass.)
123
 and Lyman Trumbull (R-Ill.).
124
  Further, 
                                                                                                                                                 
The above discussion upon treatises is also applicable to the comments Professor Dripps made on treatises.   
See Dripps, supra note ___, at ___  {Draft – pages are not numbered}.   
119
 See Bryan Wildenthal, Nationalizing the Bill of Rights: Scholarship and Commentary on the Fourteenth 
Amendment in 1867–73, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES___ (2009).    
120
 An analogous shift in public opinion may be comparing the attitudes toward slavery after the Revolution 
with those of the more repressive 1830s, or attitudes of the 1960s with those of the 1990s.   
121
 See generally HEATHER COX RICHARDSON, THE DEATH OF RECONSTRUCTION, RACE, LABOR, AND 
POLITICS IN THE POST-CIVIL WAR NORTH, 1865-1901,  93 and 101 (2001).  Others in the list included 
prominent Republican and former Union General Carl Schurz who had campaigned for both John Fremont 
and Abraham Lincoln;  Murat Halstead of the Cincinnati Commercial;  Horace White of the Chicago 
Tribune; William Cullen Bryan of the New York Evening Post; and Edwin L. Godkin of the Nation. Id. at   
243 and 102.   
122
 Id.  
123
 RICHARDSON, supra note 121 at 103.  
124
 Lyman Trumbull, http://www.encyclopedida.com/doc/1E1-TrumbullL.html (last visited Mar 10, 2009).  
Trumbull was one of the counsel for Democratic candidate Tilden in the contested 1876 Presidential 
election.  
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by 1872 the Republican Party had ―a transformed identity.‖ 125  According to Gillette, ―[w]artime 
idealism was beginning to wear thin, especially as the old ranks of Republican leaders and 
supporters were being decimated by death.  New issues demanded attention.‖ 126 
            Though Grant won re-election, there were long-term consequences.  The dissidents 
―popularized the idea that most freemen were determined to rise without work, and legitimated in 
Republican thought the Democratic idea that [B]lack voting inherently threatened to corrupt the 
government.‖ 127  Then in December of 1872, with the impeachment of Louisiana Republican 
Governor William Kellogg, Lieutenant Governor P. B. S. Pinchback, a prominent African 
American Republican, became Governor. 
128
  The mere fact that a Black leader was Governor 
―confirmed the worst fears of [many] anxious Northerners.‖ 129 
             The Colfax Massacre—―the bloodiest single‖ incident in the Reconstruction era that 
included execution style killings of individuals who had surrendered—was a ―horrific white 
massacre of African-Americans.‖130  Yet, the press described it as white action ―taken in self-
defense against pillaging ex-slaves‖ who were ―disaffected workers‖ who were ―trying to 
control‖ the local government. 131  By the end of 1873 the Boston Evening Transcript claimed that 
―the divisional lines of the Republican and Democratic parties are now . . . indistinct.‖ 132 
            These major political shifts were magnified by an international recession that began with 
the crash of the Vienna (Austria) Stock Exchange on May 9, 1873.
133
  In the United States, the 
week of September 13, 1873 saw the suspension of payments by several banking firms. 
134
  The 
bankruptcy of financier Jay Cooke on September 18, 1873, ushered in what is commonly known 
as the Panic of 1873.  By Saturday, September 20
th, ―a full-fledged panic . . . developed‖ and the 
New York Stock exchanged closed for ten days. 
135
  
                                                 
125
 GILLETTE, supra note 95, at 52.  
126
 Id.  
127
 RICHARDSON, supra note 121, at 104.  For my views on the strengths and weaknesses of this work see 
Richard L. Aynes, Book Review, 65 AM. J. OF LEGAL HISTORY 98-99 (2001).   
128
 Id. at 105.  
129
 Id.  
130
 Richardson, supra note ___, at 107.  For more on United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876) see 
CHARLES LANE, THE DAY FREEDOM DIED, THE COLFAZ MASSACRE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE 
BETRAYAL OF RECONSTRUCTION 116-117 (2008).  For more on the Colfax Massacre see NICHOLAS 
LEMANN, REDEMPTION, THE LAST BATTLE OF THE CIVIL WAR 12-30 and 163 (2006). 
131
 Richardson, supra note 121, at 107.  
132
 Id. at 110.  
133
  Samuel Rezneck, Distress, Relief, and Discontent in the United States During the Depression of 1873-
78, 58 J. OF POL. ECON.  494, 495 (1950).     
134
 Id. at 494.   
135
 Id.   
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     In the midst of our own contemporary economic problems, it is sobering to realize that this 
severe Depression—known as ―the long Depression‖ —lasted for at least five years until 1878. 136  
This recession was ―especially significant‖ because the nation was ―still recovering from the 
effects of civil war and in the process of building a great industrial and urban superstructure upon 
an agrarian foundation.  Both the foundation and the superstructure were shaken by [the] 
depression . . . .‖ 137 
      With the exception of agriculture, the railroad industry was the largest employer in the nation 
and the Depression caused not only bank failures but the bankruptcy of more than a fourth of the 
nation‘s railroads.  The index of stock prices for railroads declined by almost 60%. 138  Bank 
clearings between 1873 and 1878 fell by 32%—second only to the 55% decline during the 20th 
Century Depression between 1929 and 1932. 
139
  Commodity prices are estimated to have fallen 
30%. 
140
  Similarly, retail prices, which had already gone down after the Civil War, were 
estimated to have declined by approximately 20% between 1873 and 1877. 
141
  Yearly 
bankruptcies increased by almost 100% between 1873 and 1878. 
142
   
     Though most of the data available relates to urban dwellers, the nation was still 
overwhelmingly rural. 
143
  But the effect upon rural people was shown by the fact that while the 
estimated decline in prices was 1.7% a year, the wholesale prices for agricultural and other 
commodities ―fell at a greater rate‖ and were estimated to have declined by 3.0% per year by one 
source. 
144
  The effect was even greater than one might suspect, because ―farmers are generally 
net monetary debtors and, as such, are harmed by a fall in prices, which raises the real value of 
their debt . . . .‖ 145 
              Other businesses failed, and it is reported that in 1876 national unemployment was 14 
percent.
146
  American history—and perhaps world history—has repeatedly shown that when 
people fear they cannot feed their families, they will demand a change.  Meetings and protests 
                                                 
136
 Id. at 495.  There are suggestions that after a brief upturn in 1879-1880, the recession ―even extended 
into the 1880‘s . . . .‖ Id.  
137
 Id. 
138
 Id.  
139
 Id.  
140
 Id. at 405-06.  
141
 Id. at 496.  
142
 Id. at 496-97.  
143
 According to on-line records of the U.S. Census, in 1860 80.2% of the population lived in a rural area 
and in 1870 the percentage was 74.3%.  http://www.census.gov/population/www/censusdata/files/table-
4.pdf. 
144
 Milton Friedman, The Crime of 1873, 98 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 1159, 1171 (1990).  
145
 Id.  
146
  In New York City it was estimated that one-third of the workers were unemployed in 1873-74 and that 
other eastern cities experienced like amounts of joblessness.  Rezneck, supra note 133, at 498.   
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took place across the nation.  One of these in New York City, known as the Tompkins Square 
Riot, caused ―great alarm‖ and led to a report that it was caused by ―well-known Communists, 
Internationalism, and Free-thinkers, with a sprinkling of sympathizing natives.‖ 147 
     Congressional hearings were held on the condition of the economy in 1878 and 1879.
148
  
Because the Bankruptcy Act of 1867 aggravated the crisis by allowing a single creditor to force a 
debtor into bankruptcy, President Grant recommended its repeal. 
149
  The Supreme Court itself 
helped aggravate the problem by declaring as unconstitutional the ―familiar stay laws for the 
protection of debtors‘ assets‖ that had been used in such depression before. 150  
          The question of using paper money and backing it with gold and/or silver resulted in a 
―bitter controversy‖ during the depression.151  There is debate among economists whether the 
U.S. Coinage Act of 1873
152
 ultimately helped or hurt the economy,
153
 but the data seems to 
confirm that one of its results was to bring about deflation which, in the short run, aggravated the 
depression of 1873-1878.
154
  According to economist Milton Friedman, ―[f]or the next twenty-
seven years the silver question bedeviled the politics and the finances of the United States.‖ 155 
   It was during these times that new—and often radical—ideas were advanced.  As one 
might expect, the depression caused a refocus of political efforts and political realignments based 
upon economic issues.  In 1876 the National Greenback Labor Party was formed and in 1878 it 
not only polled over one million votes but also won fourteen seats in Congress.
156
  The Knights of 
Labor, previously a local organization in Philadelphia, held its first ―General Assembly‖ in 
                                                 
147
 Id.  This is taken from the New York Society for the Improvement of the Condition of the Poor report.  
One historian has stated that the Panic of 1873 ―hurt small farmers and small towns profoundly; prosperity 
would be found hereafter in larger towns with far more diversified economies.‖  LORLE PORTER, A PEOPLE 
SET APART: SCOTCH-IRISH IN EASTERN OHIO 830 (1998). 
148
 Friedman, supra note 144, at 502. [ I don‘t believe this is the right page number because the article starts 
on page 1159.  Is this referring to Rezneck, supra note 113, at 502?] 
149
 Id. at 505.  Congress amended the act to require the agreement of one-fourth of the creditors 
representing at least one half of the claimed debts.  Id.  The Act was finally repealed in 1878 and a new 
bankrupt act was not adopted until 1898.   
150
 Id. at 505.  Edwards v.  Kearzey, 95 U.S. 595 (1878) (infringement of contracts contrary to Art. I, 
Section 10).  Justice Harlan dissented without opinion.  Id. 
151
 Id. at 504; see also Milton Friedman, The Crime of 1873, 98 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 1159 
(1990). 
152
  17 Stat. 424 (Feb. 12, 1873) (eliminating silver coin and allowing only gold coin to be legal tender).  
153
 See Friedman, supra note 144 (noting that the consensus is that it helped the economy, though arguing 
that this was actually ―a mistake that had highly adverse consequences.‖).   
154
 Though there had been ―sharper‖ deflation after the Civil War, the rate of deflation in the U.S. between 
1875 and 1896 has been estimated at 1.7% per year.  Friedman, supra note 144, at 1170.   
155
 Id. at 1167.  
156
 Id. at 508. Friedman attributes the deflationary trend to the creation of this party.  Friedman, supra note 
144, at 1170.  
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Reading, Pennsylvania in 1878. 
157
  In 1876 a Philadelphia Congress founded a ―Workingmen‘s 
Party‖ which, in 1877, became the Socialist Labor Party. 158 
       These political developments were exacerbated by strikes and violence:  
                              The combination of depression, labor unrest, and socialistic  
                               agitation provided a lurid setting of the great railroad strike in July,  
                               1877, which stirred up passions and created an unprecedented  
                               panic of public opinion.‖ 159 
As a result:   
                                The labor disturbances of 1877 … constituted the climatic event of  
                                 the depression and precipitated a violent burst of alarm and  
                                 threat that reflected a growing fear of class conflict and the ‗red  
                                 specter of communism.‘‖ 160  
     With the help of the political re-alignment and, especially, the depression, the Democrats 
captured the House of Representatives in 1874.
161
    They won the popular vote and almost 
captured the presidency in 1876.  It is therefore, perhaps, not surprising that support for the 
Fourteenth Amendment no longer remained the focus of most peoples‘ concern and indeed, 
probably was at low ebb.                  
B. 
Confirmation: Post-Slaughter-House Literature (1873-1949) 
             The political and economic changes that occurred in the early 1870s are reflected in the 
literature that post-dated the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Justice Miller wrote about 
the ―pressure of all the excited feeling growing out of the war‖, but concluded that ―our statesmen 
have still believed [in] the existence of the States . . . . 
162
  Further, he claimed that the Court 
ignored the ―fluctuations‖ of ―public opinion.‖ 163  Yet, others provided a different account, and 
in his private writings Miller seemed to have just the opposite attitude of what he stated 
publicly.
164
  Though a more comprehensive account has previously been published, 
165
 in this 
                                                 
157
 Id.  
158
 Id.   
159
 Id.  
160
 Id. at 510.  [Again, does this refer to Rezneck?  See comments fn. 148] 
161
 FONER, supra note 48 , at 523 (― . . . only the depression can explain the electoral tidal wave that swept 
over the North in 1874.‖). [Which Foner source are you referring to?] 
162
 Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 82 (1872).  
163
 Id.  
164
 Aynes, supra note 117, at 553-665 (quoting letters from Miller and assessments by Fairman about 
Miller‘s low opinion of Congress and his view that Congress was ―bent on wrecking‖ an independent 
Judiciary and Executive).  Of course, Miller also opposed the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Id. 
at 660.           
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section three examples will illustrate the views of those who celebrated the failure to properly 
interpret the Amendment.  
               Congressman Samuel Shellabarger (R-Ohio) was considered a key ―Radical 
theoretician.‖ 166  Yet as early as 1871 Shellabarger did not ―want the full idea of the Fourteenth 
Amendment interpreted by the old rules of construction.‖ 167  In 1888, at the memorial services 
for Chief Justice Waite, Shellabarger acknowledged that Cruikshank was contrary to the intent of 
the Fourteenth amendment.
168
  But Shellabarger concluded that Waite would be well thought of 
by history because ―the lapse of years had matured men‘s views and cooled their feeling 
regarding the results of the late war.‖169 
            Similarly, University of Missouri Law Professor Christopher G. Tiedman indicated that 
the Court in the Slaughter-House Cases had worked ―a successful modification of the rule found 
in the fourteenth amendment.‖170  He thought this was justified because the Court was keeping 
the ―amendment within the limits which [the majority of the court] felt assured would have been 
imposed by the people, if their judgment has not been blinded with passion, and which in their 
cooler moments they would ratify.‖ 171  According to Tiedman:  
                        Feeling assured that the people in their cooler moments would not  
                          have sanctioned the far-reaching effects of their action; that they  
                          lost sight of the general effect in their eager pursue of a special end,  
                          the court dared to withstand the popular will as expressed in the  
                          letter of this amendment . . . . 
172
 
The third selected example is from the American Law Review:  
          Never was the court truer to itself, and truer to the constitution,  
             than when it passed upon the momentous question involved in the  
             Slaughter-House Cases.  A literal interpretation of the fourteenth  
             amendment would have destroyed local self-government, reduced the 
                                                                                                                                                 
165
 Id. at 678-686.   
166
 WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 164 (1972).   
167
  HAROLD M. HYMAN AND WILLIAM M. WIECEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 
1835-1875, 471 (1982) (quoting portions of the letter).  Professor Curtis points out that in 1871 
Shellabarger was a leader in advocating legislation against the Ku Klux Klan and utilized the Fourteenth 
Amendment as the basis for that legislation.  E-mail from M. K. Curtis to R. L. Aynes, Jan. 11, 2009 (on 
file with author).  I am not sure there is any inevitable inconsistency between the two positions, and yet it 
raises questions about the Congressman‘s actual position over time.  Shellabarger would be a good subject 
for a biography or biographical article.   
168
 In Memoriam: Morrison Remick Waite, L.L.D. 126 U.S. App. 585, 600-01 (1888).  
169
 Id.   
170
 CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDMAN, THE UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 108 (1890).  
171
 Id. (emphasis added).  
172
 Id. at 102-03.   
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             States to the condition of mere provinces, and swept away that Federal  
             fabric which our fathers had builded [sic] with such painful and loving care.  
             That such a result was contemplated by the political leaders who secured  
              the adoption of the fourteenth amendment is certain.  But the high  
              patriotism of the Supreme Court led it to construe this amendment in 
             accordance with the traditions and true spirit of our constitution, and to 
             preserve to our people the inestimable advantages of local self-    
             government.
173
  
These views help reinforce the reasons why one must look to the period before ratification to 
determine the public understanding of the Amendment.  
Guidance from the 19
th
 and 21
st
 Amendments 
What is the appropriate C. 
response when public attitudes make major changes such as occurred between 1868 and the 
1870s?  The answer is found in example of the Eighteenth Amendment enacting prohibition 
which was declared ratified on January 29, 1919.
174
   Ultimately, it was ratified by forty-five of 
the then forty-eight states.  
               The transformation of public opinion on prohibition illustrates the process in which one 
should be engaged when vast shifts of opinion occur after the ratification of a Constitutional 
Amendment.  One has to ask oneself, what was the status of the Eighteenth Amendment while 
ratification of the 21
st
 Amendment was pending and it appeared to be evident that the public had 
repudiated that Amendment, but before it was actually repealed?  No one would argue that the 
change in public support meant that the Eighteenth Amendment was no longer in effect.  No one 
would advise clients that the statutes prohibiting the manufacture and transportation of alcohol 
adopted pursuant to the Eighteenth Amendment were no longer enforceable prior to its formal 
repeal.  No one would expect to successfully defend one‘s clients against criminal charges in the 
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 Kenneth Katkin, ―Incorporation‖ of the Criminal Procedure Amendments: The View from the States, 
84 NEB, L. REV. 397, 403 n.25 (2005) (citations omitted and emphasis added) (quoting Walter D. Coles, 
Politics and the Supreme Court of the United States, 27 AM. L. REV. 182, 206 (1893)).  
174
 U.S. CONST. art. XVIII.  The Amendment was overwhelmingly adopted, with thirty-six of the forty-
eight states having ratified it on January16, 1919.  Subsequent to the declaration that the Amendment had 
been adopted, it was ratified by nine additional states.  This made the total number of ratifying states to be 
forty-five out of the forty-eight states.  The only state that explicitly rejected the Amendment was Rhode 
Island.  Two other states took no action.  In spite of this overwhelming ―super-majority,‖ just fourteen 
years later, effective December 5, 1933, the 21
st
 Amendment was ratified repealing the Eighteenth 
Amendment.  Thirty-six of the forty-eight states had ratified the repeal by December 5, 1933.  The 
Amendment was subsequently ratified by two additional states and rejected by South Carolina.  This meant 
that the final total was 38 states in favor of repeal, one state opposed, and nine states not taking any action.   
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Federal Courts based on the shift in public opinion with respect to the Eighteenth Amendment 
prior to its repeal.     
                What was the legal status of the Eighteenth Amendment while the Twenty-first 
Amendment was pending and appeared to be likely to be adopted?   This example parallels—but 
only to a point—what has happened with the Fourteenth Amendment.  The Republicans had won 
―the super majority‖ in the 1866 elections and the Fourteenth Amendment was viewed as a 
moderate response to the intransigence of the defeated Confederates and the terrorists who were 
committing violence against African-Americans and Unionists.  But, what frequently goes 
unrecognized is that there was a shift in public sentiment which assuredly took place as early as 
1871 and continued well into the 1880s.  Even the time spans are relatively the same.  It was 
roughly fifteen years from the proposal of the Eighteenth Amendment until its repeal, which was 
completed on December 5, 1933.  It was somewhere between seven and thirteen years between 
the proposal and the Fourteenth Amendment and the demise of public support for the 
enforcement of that Amendment.  
            It is important to note that trying to judge the intentions or public understanding of the 
Fourteenth Amendment in 1866 by actions and statements the people took after 1871 (or 1879) is 
as inappropriate as trying to judge people‘s feelings about the Eighteenth Amendment‘s original 
intention by their action in passing the Twenty-First Amendment or visa versa.  What is different, 
and I submit of Constitutional significance, is that the Eighteenth Amendment was formally 
repealed by the Twenty-First Amendment while certain provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment 
were nullified and are currently sought to be kept in a suspended state today based on the actions 
of judges and policy reasons without any formal amendment process. 
V. 
Round-up the usual suspects: Slaughter-House, Cruikshank, 
                                                     Hurtado, and Twining  
Since I first wrote about Slaughter-House
175
 in 1994, 
176
 much work has been done in the field of 
applying the Bill of Rights to the states, and also upon the pre-Adamson cases of the U.S. 
Supreme Court. 
177
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 83 U.S. 36 (1873).  
176
 Richard L. Aynes, Constricting the Law of Freedom: Justice Miller, The Fourteenth Amendment, and 
the Slaughter-House Cases, 70 CHI-KENT L. J. 627 (1994). 
177
 A recent symposium at the University Akron School of Law commemorated the 140
th
 Anniversary of 
the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Among the topics on which articles will be forthcoming are 
Slaughter-House, Bradwell v. Illinois, and United States v. Cruikshank.  See generally 42 AKRON L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2009).  
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           Scholars sometimes write loosely about Slaughter-House as a case in which the central 
issue was the inability of the local butchers to pursue a lawful trade or the creation of a monopoly 
of that trade.  This might be a fair reading of the inferences one could draw from Justice Field‘s 
dissent.  But a close reading of the facts of the case and Justice Miller‘s opinion indicates that the 
issue was much narrower than that.  All were free to pursue the occupation of a butcher and the 
monopoly related not to the profession, but rather to the location of the place in which the 
butchering could take place. 
178
   
     Indeed, the state‘s interest in sanitation was great and the ultimate decision was one which 
Justice Hunt had previously decided in his role as a Justice of the New York Court of Appeals in 
Metropolitan Board of Health v. Heister in 1868.
179
  This was also a health issue that Justice 
Miller knew about as a citizen and former physician with health concerns based on his experience 
with the stockyards in Iowa. 
180
  Had the opinions been limited to those issues, there would be 
little or no controversy about the case.  
     Two important books have come to the forefront since 2000 that reinforce these views.  
Professors Ronald M. Labbe and Jonathan Laurie, in The Slaughterhouse Cases: Regulation, 
Reconstruction, and the Fourteenth Amendment,
181
 explore the health and sanitation issues in 
detail and provide the documentation for one‘s instinct that there was overwhelming justification 
for the Court‘s ultimate conclusion to sustain the legislation as an appropriate health measure.   
        Michael A. Ross‘ 2003 biography of Justice Miller182 is a welcomed improvement to Charles 
Fairman‘s 1939 biography.183  Professor Ross‘ work compliments the work of Laurie and Labbte 
on the propriety of the health regulations.  Further, Ross provides insight to critical matters that 
had not heretofore come to light. 
184
  
        The problem with the majority opinion in Slaughter-House is, as it has always been, with its 
dicta.  Courts and scholars have read that dicta to preclude a number of reasonable interpretations 
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 Aynes, supra note 176, at 634.  
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 37 N.Y. 661 (1868).   
180
 MICHAEL A. ROSS, JUSTICE OF SHATTERED DREAMS, SAMUEL FREEMAN MILLER AND THE SUPREME 
COURT DURING THE CIVIL WAR ERA 43-44, 168 (2003).  
181
 (2003).  
182
 ROSS, supra note 180.   Though I am not prepared to embrace Professor Ross‘s view of Justice Miller, 
his well-done biography convinces me that Miller was more of a Republican than I once thought. 
183
 CHARLES FAIRMAN, MR. JUSTICE MILLER AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1862-1890 (1939).  Professor 
Fairman‘s biography still has value because it reprints large portions of Justice Miller‘s correspondence.  
184
 For example, Ross points to the monopoly that was previously held by the white butchers of New 
Orleans.  As to the occupation of a butcher, Ross demonstrates that the legislation of Louisiana‘s 
Republican government actually removed that monopoly and made it possible for others, including African 
Americans, to enter the profession.  Equally important, Ross chronicles the efforts of the defeated 
aristocracy to withhold tax money from the Republican government in order to cause its collapse and the 
financial terms under which the Slaughter-House would produce revenue for the government to counter 
that illegal scheme.  ROSS, supra note 180, at 189-210.   
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of the Fourteenth Amendment, including the enforcement of the Bill of Rights against the 
states.
185
  Numerous scholars have traced the virtual elimination of the privilege or immunities 
clause back to the dicta of this decision and this appears to be the view of the overwhelming 
number of scholars who have examined the case.
186
   
      In the last twenty-five years a minority view has risen that argues that the Slaughter-House 
Cases actually recognized that the Bill of Rights would apply to the states.  The basis for this has 
been Justice Miller‘s quotation of some language from the First Amendment (without referencing 
the amendment) right of assembly and petition,
187
 which led some to conclude that this was one 
of the privileges or immunities of U.S. citizenship. 
188
  I remain skeptical of these approaches for 
reasons I have already articulated. 
189
  We may care deeply about these questions as scholars and 
historians, but for lawyers and would be litigators, it hardly matters.  Virtually everyone agrees 
that the Court took a wrong turn somewhere.  The key issue is not when that took place, but what 
does one do about it.   
        Dicta is dicta.  Justice Miller‘s opinion itself identified the fact that a portion of the opinion 
is dicta.  Justice Miller‘s opinion talks about being ―excused from defining the privileges and 
immunities of citizens of the United States . . . until some case . . . may make it necessary to do 
                                                 
185
 See Aynes, supra note 176, at 627 n.4.   
186
  Id.  
187
 ―The right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances, the privilege of the writ of 
habeas corpus, are rights of the citizens guaranteed in the Federal Constitution.‖ Slaughter-House Cases, 83 
U.S. 36, 79 (1873).  Part of the issue to consider is whether the quoted provision refers only to the federal 
government or also applies to the states.  David Bogen concludes that the ―reaction of the dissenters 
demonstrated that Miller did not intend to use the privileges or immunities clause to create a whole new set 
of federal rights.‖   David Bogen, Slaughter-House Five: Views of the Case, 55 HASTINGS L. J. 333 (2003).  
188
 Robert Palmer, The Parameters of Constitutional Reconstruction: Slaughter-House, Cruikshank, and the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 739, 743 (1984); Kevin C. Newsome, Setting 
Incorporationism Straight: A Reinterpretation of the Slaughter-House Cases, 109 YALE L. J. 643, 683 
(2000).  A variation on this theme was recently advanced by Professor David Bogen.  Bogen argues that 
this is a question of whether the glass is one half full or one half empty, and that one should look at what 
issues Slaughter-House left open.  David Bogen, Rebuilding the Slaughter-House: The Cases‘ Support for 
Civil Rights, 42 AKRON L. REV. (forthcoming 2009).  
 
189
 See generally Aynes, supra note 176.  
If Justice Miller intended to enforce the Bill of Rights against the states, then how does one explain his 
failure to join Justice Harland‘s dissent in Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884)?  It seems that one 
has to either conclude that between 1873 and 1884 Miller changed his mind or that he never had that 
intention in the first place.  Further, in spite of the fine work of Laurie, Labbet, and Ross, none of them has 
a satisfactory answer to the question of why Miller misquoted the language of Article IV and Justice 
Bushrod Washington‘s correct quotation of Article IV, in a way that made his textual argument stronger.  
Aynes, supra note 176, at 647.  Palmer has suggested that Miller was simply ―updating‖ the constitution to 
reflect the Court‘s decisions.  Palmer, supra note 188, at 754.  But, frankly, that seems unsatisfactory.  In 
what other case has the Court ever done this?  It would be one thing to properly quote the language and 
then explain how the court‘s cases change the language.  But it is quite another to misquote language 
without giving any explanation.  
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so.‖ 190  He then, instead of ending the opinion, went on to give some examples. 191  It is true that 
Miller‘s dicta—whether correctly or incorrectly interpreted—has been relied upon by later courts 
even within the last year. 
192
  Yet, it seems to me that we ought to follow the lead of the Lincoln 
Republicans who treated Dred Scott as only binding for the case between the parties and ignored 
what they considered dicta in the case. 
193
 
     As scholars and legal historians, it is perfectly appropriate that we continue to analyze and 
debate the meaning and effect of Justice Miller‘s opinion in Slaughter-House.  As   matters of 
public policy in the national arena for purposes of litigation or legislation, I would suggest that 
we need to emulate the approach of President Lincoln and the Republicans: note the Slaughter-
House dicta for what is (dicta) and move on to find a proper interpretation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  
         United States v. Cruikshank 
194
  has become a matter of interest in the last few years and at 
least three books have been published on the Colfax Massacre that underlies that case. 
195
  Given 
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 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 79 (1873).  Similarly, in a discussion about the new articles of 
amendment Miller wrote: 
         [W]e now propose to announce the judgments of those articles, so far as we have found  
           them necessary to the decision of the cases before us, and beyond that we have neither  
           the inclination nor the right to go. 83 U.S. at 67 (emphasis added).    
191
 Though this is speculation, one wonders whether an earlier draft stopped there and it was the dissents 
that prompted him to go further?   
192
 E.g. National Rifle Ass'n of America, Inc. v. Chicago, 567 F.3d 856 (7th Cir. 2009)  
petition for cert.filed, 77 U.S.L.W. 3679 (U.S. Jun. 03, 2009) (No. 08-1497) and 
petition for cert. filed, 77 U.S.L.W. 3691 (Jun. 09, 2009)(No. 08-1521);  
Merrifield v. Lockyer , 547 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2008).  
193
  Speech on [the] Dred Scott Decision at Springfield, Illinois, June 16, 1857 in LINCOLN, SPEECHES, 
LETTERS, MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS, THE LINCOLN DOUGLAS DEBATES 392 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed., 
1989).  I have analyzed many of the rejections of the Taney‘s opinion in Richard L. Aynes, Unintended 
Consequences of the Fourteenth Amendment and What they tell us about its interpretation, 39 AKRON L. 
REV. 289, 292-297 (2006).  At a minimum they include:  
       * Attorney General Bates‘s opinion that African Americans could be U.S. citizens, 10 Op. Att‘y Gen.  
          382 (1862);   
       * Congress‘s definition of citizenship in the 1866 Civil Rights Act;  
       * The action of Congress, signed by President Lincoln , abolishing slavery in the territories; and 
       * The action of Congress, signed by President Lincoln, abolishing slavery in the District of  
          Columbia. 
 The seating of Senator Hiram Revels (R-Miss.) in the U.S. Senate even though if Dred Scott had 
been good law, Senator Revels could not have met the durational citizenship requirements of Art. I  
Section 3 (requiring citizenship for nine years).  
  
194
 92 U.S. 542 (1875).  
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 CHARLES LANE, THE DAY FREEDOM DIED, THE COLFAX MASSACRE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE 
BETRAYAL OF RECONSTRUCTION (2008); NICHOLAS LEMAN, REDEMPTION, THE LAST BATTLE OF THE CIVIL 
WAR 12-29, 163 (2006) (Cruikshank ―dealt a heavy blow to Reconstruction . . .‖); LEE ANNA KEITH, THE 
COLFAX MASSACRE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF BLACK POWER, WHITE TERROR AND THE DEATH OF 
RECONSTRUCTION (2008).  
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the U.S. Supreme Court‘s decision in Heller v. District of Columbia,196 Cruickshank will be the 
likely subject of some future Supreme Court consideration of the question of whether Heller 
should be extended to apply to the states.  If Heller is extended to the states, it is probable that 
Cruikshank will be overruled. 
197
 
            In contrast to Slaughter-House and Cruikshank, Hurtado v. California 
198
 and Twining v. 
New Jersey
199
 have not received significant scholarly attention.  Hurtado is of interest today  
because of Justice Harlan‘s dissent  and because of the failure of Justice Miller to join Harlan‘s 
dissent.  
           Twining, in spite of the dissent of the then aged Harlan, 75 years old at the time, was 
decided without the knowledge—let alone the fervor—of reconstruction.  Justice Moody, who 
wrote the majority opinion, was only fifteen years old when the Fourteenth Amendment 
adopted.
200
 
     One of the critical mistakes, illustrated by Cruikshank and by the Slaughter-House dicta, is the 
idea that rights protected by the state could not also be protected by the federal government.  As 
set forth above, the states had already proven time and time again they could not be trusted to 
provide even basic rights, let alone those rights to which Unionists believed all citizens were 
entitled. 
201
  When James Madison originally proposed an amendment that would have enforced a 
limited set of rights against the states, he said that it did not matter if these rights were already 
protected by a state constitution because it would provide ―double security.‖ 202  This was the 
same concept the Unionists were pursuing in adopting the Fourteenth Amendment.   
     But the citizenship clause indicates a change: that instead of national citizenship being 
derivative from state citizenship, and state citizenship being primary, the framers made national 
citizenship primary. 
203
  To use a common example, the ―problem‖ was not with the lack of 
                                                 
196
 423 U.S. 840, 128 S. Ct. 2783, (2008).   
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 Cruikshank still lives, having been cited with approval by the Chief Justice Rehnquist in his decision in 
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 622 (2000).  If the Court decides to take a fourteenth amendment 
case based on Heller, it would also have to consider its prior language  in Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 
265 (1886) (―The second amendment is a limitation only upon the power of Congress . . . and not upon . . . 
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 110 U.S. 516, 534-35 (1884) (the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not include the 
right to a grand jury indictment and that right, included in the Fifth Amendment, is not enforceable against 
the states).    
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 211 U.S. 78, 99 (1908) (Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination cannot be enforced against the 
states).  
200
 CONCISE DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 690 (Joseph G. E. Hopkin ed., 1964.)   
201
 See supra Section II . 
202
 1 Annals of Congress 458 (June 8, 1789).  
203
 Prior to the amendment it was thought that state citizenship, ipso facto, created national citizenship.  See 
the dissenting opinion of Justice Swayne in the Slaughter-House Cases.  83 U.S. 36, 126 (1872).  As my 
colleague Wilson R. Huhn has noted, the Amendment made ―state citizenship secondary to national 
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existence of a right like ―free speech‖ in the southern states.  It was guaranteed by their 
constitutions, their statutes, and their case law.  The problem was, like the problem with the antis-
slavery theory of the enforcement of Article IV, in the ―enforcement‖ of that right.  Though other 
examples exist, the disputes over free speech were so strong and so far ranging that they offer a 
good illustration.  The debates over free speech at both the national and state level were spirited, 
public debates in which no citizen interested in the future of the nation between 1830 and 1868 
could have been ignorant.  
        They included disputes about the meaning and interpretation of the national protections like 
the right of petition under the ―gag rule‖ in which millions of signatures were gathered in a 
nationwide campaign eventually lead by former President and Representative John Q. Adams. 
They included the controversy over the actions of President Jackson‘s Postmaster General in 
―seizing‖ anti-slavery literature from the mail. 204  They also included resistance against the 
Fugitive Slave laws, and especially the Act of 1850, because of its lack of jury trial and other due 
process procedures to protect free African Americans from being kidnapped and sent to slavery 
when, in fact, they were free people.
205
  But that struggle also included many state and local 
attempts to suppress free speech and even to suppress the Republican Party itself.   
             Prior portions of this paper have used free speech issues as an example of the evil against 
which the Amendment was directed.
206
  A modern analysis of the free speech issues is set forth in 
Michael Kent Curtis‘s Free Speech, ‗The People‘s Darling Privilege:‘ Struggles for Freedom of 
Expression in American History.
207
  Republicans, who had grown from a minority to a majority 
party controlling state and national governments, attributed this growth to free speech and 
                                                                                                                                                 
citizenship.‖  Wilson R. Huhn, The Legacy of Slaughterhouse, Bradwell, and Cruikshank in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 42 AKRON L. REV. (forthcoming 2009).  In speaking of the Slaughter-House Cases 
Professor Huhn concluded: ―The majority of the Court turned that unmistakable hierarchy on its head, and 
as a result they consigned the fundamental freedoms that Americans rightfully regard as their birthright to 
the dubious protection of the States.‖  Id.  Further, Professor Huhn concluded that ―[i]n placing state 
citizenship over national citizenship the Slaughterhouse Court reflected the view of John C. Calhoun.  Id.  
In 1833 Calhoun had equated the idea of citizens of the United States to ―a citizen of the world . . . a perfect 
nondescript‖ and stated that our rights depend upon being citizens of a State or territory.‖   Id.  See also the 
Supreme Court‘s indication that after the Fourteenth Amendment national citizenship was ―paramount and 
dominant instead of being subordinate and derivative . . . .‖  Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366, 389 
(1918).    
204
  JON MEACHAM, AMERICAN LION, ANDREW JACKSON IN THE WHITE HOUSE 304-306 (2008).   
205
 The kidnapping of free African Americans had always been a problem and even a young Roger Taney 
had supported a statute in Maryland to prohibit such conduct.  JAMES F. SIMON, LINCOLN AND CHIEF 
JUSTICE TANEY 9 (2006).   
206
 See supra notes 46, 56-94 and accompanying text.  
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 (2000). For other works on these same issues see CLEMENT EATON, THE FREEDOM OF THOUGHT 
STRUGGLE IN THE OLD SOUTH (1949); RUSSELL B. NYE, FETTERED FREEDOM: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE 
SLAVERY CONTROVERSY, 1830-1860 (1964); and  ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, AND FREE MEN: 
THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY (1970).  
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fervently believed that it was necessary for the future safety of the country.  In other words, this 
was a ―national security issue.‖ 208 
    This can be examined in the issues of Harper's Weekly.  In 1865 Harper‘s Weekly claimed to 
have had a circulation of more than 100,000 per week. 
209
  It was called by a rival, ―one of the 
most powerful organs of public opinion.‖ 210  
     On July 20, 1861 Harper‘s stated that the government was protecting the ―rights of man‖ and 
―[i]ts army, therefore, marches to defend those rights, and among others that of free speech.‖ 211 
Further, Harper‘s declared that ―[t]he right of the freest speech and of petition are the birth-right 
of every American citizen.‖212  In speaking of the newspapers of the rebellious states and their 
attempt to ―annihilate[e] free speech,‖ Harper‘s concluded with a statement about federal 
enforcement:  ―They will be protected in the exercise of that right [free speech] by the same 
Government of all the people, which will frustrate the end they [rebels] seek.‖ 213 
In its August 17, 1861 issue, Harper‘s Weekly stated that the majority of Americans ―after 
conquering this rebellion, means to have guarantees for its rights.‖  Harper‘s continued: ―Those 
rights are the constitutional privilege of every American citizen; his right to go freely everywhere 
in the country; and of freely expressing his opinion.‖ 214 
     On the same page of the same issue, the editors printed an item with the title ―Good 
Citizenship‖ in which they indicated that the Union was waging a war for ―free popular 
institutions‖ that were based upon the ―rights of men‖ and that ―the most absolute freedom of 
discussion is one of the chief of those rights.‖  The effect of the protection of these rights was 
predicted to result in the ―reconstruction of the entire frame-work of Southern society.‖ 215  One 
might ponder how freedom of speech could be protected and the white, slaveholding society 
reconstructed without some mechanism for national enforcement of free speech and other rights.  
     That there was to be a change is seen as the assertion that though the rebellion of ―Jeff Davis . 
. . does not destroy the Union, it does destroy the old despotism which nullified the Constitution 
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adopting that amendment to provide National security against violation by the States of the fundamental 
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 RRICHARDSON, supra note  121  at xii. 
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 Id. It has been referred to as ―the leading national magazine . . .‖ DOUGLAS L. WILSON, LINCOLN‘S 
SWORD, THE PRESIDENT AND THE POWER OF WORDS 144 (2008).   
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 Of Liberty of Speech, HARPER‘S WEEKLY, July 20, 1861, at 451.   
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 Id.; see also A Word to Bostonian, HARPER‘S WEEKLY, Jan. 4, 1862 p. 3 (circulation of ―a hundred and 
twenty thousand copies‖). 
213
  HARPER‘S WEEKLY, supra note 211. 
214
 Id.  
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 The Union – in the Future, HARPER‘S WEEKLY, June 15, 1861, 370; Good Citizenship, HARPER‘S 
WEEKLY , Aug. 17, 1861, at 514, 706.  
 36 
and used the Union as-it-was for its tool.‖ 216  Still later in the war, in 1864, a Harper‘s editorial 
summarized the theory that it was important—to avoid a future war— that there be free speech217:  
               It was the knowledge that, if the right of free speech, guaranteed by the  
                 Constitution, were tolerated in the South, slavery would be destroyed by the  
                 common-sense of the Southern people, which made Calhoun and all his school  
                 insist upon suppressing it.  Consequently, in its most important provision, 
                 the Constitution has been a dead letter in every slave State for more than  
                 thirty years.
218
 
            Similarly, Harper‘s editorialized that:  
                 The slave-drivers and their political allies at the North knew equally well that  
                    if the constitutional right of discussion were allowed, the horrors of the system  
                    would be known, and the outraged decency and humanity of the American  
                     people would sweep away the inquiry in a flood of wrath.
219
  
            The Republicans believed that had free speech been allowed to flourish, slavery would 
have been abolished and the war averted.  For example, noting that a Democratic Judge has 
charged a Grand Jury that ―the right of free discussion is a cardinal condition of a republic, ‖  
Harper‘s stated that this charge ―contains several wholesome truths which, had they not been 
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 The Thing to Be Done, HARPER‘S WEEKLY, Nov. 14, 1863, at 722; see also Knowing What you Want, 
but Not How to Get It, HARPER‘S WEEKLY, Nov. 14, 1863.  ―Its misfortune is that it ruled by virtue of its 
alliances with a system which permanently paralyzed the Constitution, and is now seeking to destroy it.‖  
Id. 
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 Id.   This same theme was explored in ―The Union-as-it-was‖, an article focusing upon the speeches of 
Texan Unionist and slaveholder Andrew Jackson Hamilton.  Hamilton supported the constitution as 
written, but not ―as-it-was‖ in Texas before the war because the constitution ―as-it-is‖ written ―was 
constantly trampled under foot, and the very object of the Union despised and outraged.‖  He said that if he 
quoted certain beliefs of Washington and Jefferson in Texas he would have been ―stigmatized as a traitor, 
and meet a traitor‘s death.‖  But Hamilton said: ―If I can enjoy the right of speech, the great and 
inestimable right intended to be secured to me by the Constitution, then I can bless the Union.‖  According 
to Harper‘s 
the ―most sacred provisions [of the Constitution] were outraged in every State now rebellious.‖  Moreover:  
―No man‘s life was safe below Mason Dixon‘s line who exercised the right, guaranteed to him by the 
Constitution, of saying what he thought upon public affairs.‖  (emphasis added).  Later the same article 
referred to the right of ―free expression‖ as a ―guaranteed right of the people of this country under the 
Constitution . . .‖  It also made reference to the incident in South Carolina involving Judge Hoar and to 
Yancy‘s ability to have free speech in the North but the inability to Mr. Phillips to have free speech in the 
South.  HARPER‘S WEEKLY, Oct. 18, 1862, at 658.  
218
 ―The Truth Confessed,‖ HARPER‘S WEEKLY, Jan. 16, 1864, at 34.  After the war there was talk of 
another war by both Republicans and Democrats.  See  CAMPAIGN SPEECHES, supra note 63, at 16 col. 2 
(―Another War‖—discussed the alleged movement of armaments to the northern states); Republican Party 
Platform at the re-nomination of Congressman Ashley (if violence against Unionists continues there will be 
a civil war), supra note 92. 
219
 Slave Children, HARPER‘S WEEKLY, Jan. 23, 1864, at 66. (As a result ―these gentry hung, and burned, 
and tarred and feathered, and mobbed every citizen who chose to speak or was suspected of wishing to 
speak . . . .‖).  
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hitherto uniformly despised and outraged by the political allies of the Judge, would have saved us 
from the war.‖ 220 
              In a June 6, 1863 column Harper‘s Weekly noted that anti-war Democrats had held a 
mass meeting calling for ―free speech and personal rights‖ even though they have and want to 
continue to deny these rights to others. 
221
  The implications of this for the future were made clear 
in a column on August 6, 1864: 
             The people of the United States, therefore, in their Constitution have forbidden  
               Congress to abridge either of these rights [freedom of press and freedom of speech];  
                and what they would not suffer their supreme legislature to do, they will not permit to  
                to any local assembly. 
222
 
The stakes on this issue were very high because according to Harper‘s, ―[w]ithout freedom of 
speech and of the press a free popular government is impossible.‖ 223  Speaking of the Union 
Army as ―an immense mass meeting,‖ Harper‘s assured the anti-war Democrats that this 
―meeting‖ was ―in perpetual session‖ and would not adjourn until:  
                             the flag of the United States shall secure the undisputed exercise  
                             of every constitutional right upon every inch of the United States soil;  
                             until Mr. Wendell Phillips shall be protected in his freedom of saying  
                             in Charleston that slavery is a blunder and a crime, precisely as Mr.  
                             Fernando Wood is protected in New York in saying that the colored  
                             race is a servile people and ought to be enslaved; and until the  
                             personal rights of man . . . are fully recognized in Georgia as they are in  
                             Maine. 
224
 
           Nor was this just a passing theme.  Rather, free speech was a continuing source of 
comment during the war years. 
225
  Further, these concerns were not limited to free speech and 
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 Judge Barnard‘s Charges, HARPER‘S WEEKLY, Apr. 23, 1864, at 258 (emphasis added).  
221
 Mass Meeting, HARPER‘S WEEKLY, June 6, 1863, at 354.  One of the many important contributions that 
Professor Curtis has made to the history of these issues is his recognition that Democrats, as well as 
Republicans, were concerned about free speech and they often raised these issues during the war against the 
policy of some Republications, including, on occasion, President Lincoln.  See generally Curtis, supra note 
77, at 1121-1124 and 1131.  
222
   Id. (emphasis added).   
223
   Id.  The article summarizes statutes limiting freedom of speech in Louisiana and Virginia and then 
rhetorically asks: ―. . . but are they compatible with the Constitution of the United States, and with the 
necessary conditions of any free popular government whatever?‖ 
224
 Id. (emphasis added).  
225
 Due to space constraints, I eliminated from this footnote citation to thirteen articles from Harper‘s 
Weekly involving constitutional rights that were violated or claimed.  These were mainly free speech issues, 
but included free press, freedom of assembly, free elections, personal liberty, and search and seizure.  Many 
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press—even though those rights are often said to be the source of the protection of all rights—but 
included others rights such as prohibition of illegal seizures, legal process before imprisonment, 
the right to test disputed issues in court, and the right to be protected from mobs. 
226
 
            This theme was developed by Justice Bradley after the war.  In his dissent in the 
Slaughter-House Cases, he wrote that the ―mischief to be remedied‖ was not only slavery, but  
―that intolerance of free speech and free discussion which often rendered life and property 
insecure . . . . 
227
   The goal of the Fourteenth Amendment was to create conditions under which 
―American citizenship should be a sure guarantee of safety, and in which every citizen of the 
United States might stand erect on every portion of its soil, in the full enjoyment of every right 
and privilege belonging to a freeman, without fear of violence or molestation.‖ 228 
          No one doubts that a proslavery person like slave-trader Nathan B. Forrest or a secessionist 
like Jefferson Davis was able to speak his mind in the south.  But that right of free expression did 
not extend to those of opposite views, and this lack of enforcement was the problem. 
229
  Indeed, 
given the free speech problems the nation had experienced, Congress and the people knew first 
hand that they could not trust the state governments to enforce the right.  If it was to be 
guaranteed, it had to be able to be enforced by the federal government.  
              In a treatise published in 1868, while the Fourteenth Amendment was pending, but had 
not yet been adopted, John Norton Pomeroy, Dean of the Law School and Chair of Political 
Science at New York University, illustrated the problem with the right of protection by the ―due 
                                                                                                                                                 
of them assert that the rights already apply to the state and were violated by the slave states.  If anyone 
would like to receive a list of citations to the articles, I will be happy to provide it.  raynes@uakron.edu.    
226
 The Arch Rebel, HARPER‘S WEEKLY, Aug. 13, 1864, at 514 (indicating that slavery ―would destroy the 
national rights of citizens of the United States . . . because of their color or for the exercise of privileges 
secured by the national Constitution‖; giving the mobbing of Judge Hoar and his daughter as an example).  
227
 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 123 (1873).  Justice Bradley‘s analysis indicates that there is a link 
between the free speech rights under the first amendment and the rights to life and property which are 
protected by other amendments. 
228
 Id. (emphasis added).  
229
  This example illustrates a common problem among scholars.  If we were in the position of the anti-
slavery person denied the right to speak our views as Davis and Forrest were, we could characterize this as 
an equal protection/discrimination violation.  But as a practical matter, people do not speak or think that 
way.  They would claim a First Amendment violation.  The same approach is true of other claims— a right 
to bear arms, search and seizure, cruel and unusual punishment and similar rights.  They could all be 
couched in equal protection terms, but we think about think and act upon them as rights in and of 
themselves and not limited to a right of equality or non-discrimination.  This was true in the 19
th
 Century as 
well.   
 
It is perhaps coincidental, but all those who use such a non-discrimination provision only view of the 
Amendment also want to narrowly construe the Fourteenth Amendment.   
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process‖ clause which existed in both the state constitutions and the federal construction. 230 
Because of Barron, Pomeroy noted:  
                          But in a case arising under the clause in a state constitution which  
                            forbids a person to be deprive of life, liberty, or property without  
                            due process of law, the Supreme Court of the United States cannot  
                            pass directly and independently upon the question whether a given  
                            state statute, or a given act done under the authority of the state,  
                            is opposed to this clause, but must defer to, and be controlled by,  
                            the judgments of the courts of the same commonwealth which have  
                            settled the construction given their own organic law. 
231
 
Though the import of Pomeroy‘s thinking is relatively clear from the above reference to the due 
process clause and related state provisions, he left nothing to chance and explicitly stated:  
                            Here is plainly a vast field open for injustice and oppression by  
                            individual states, which the nation has now no means of preventing. 
232
 
In light of this situation, Pomeroy proposed two hypotheticals (―let it be supposed . . .‖233). The 
hypotheticals involved state constitutional clauses ―securing to the people the right of keeping 
and bearing arms‖ and also protection under a state due process clause.234  Thus, while the people 
reading this would be only concerned with the actual rights (keeping and bearing arms and due 
process), the lawyers would be aware he was talking of state analogs to the Second and Fifth 
Amendments.  The ―hypothetical‖ continues with the legislature passing two types of statutes.235  
One requires ―certain classes of inhabitants—say [N]egroes‖ to ―surrender their arms‖ and 
                                                 
230
 Professor Rosenthal provides a different reading of Pomeroy that, I respectfully suggest, is unique 
among scholars. Compare Rosenthal, supra note ___, at ___  {Draft at 22} with the scholars cited in 
Wildenthal, supra note 4 {Draft at 69}.  Pomeroy wrote about the ―rule of interpretation‖ of Barron v. 
Baltimore.  Pomeroy indicated that while it is ―firmly established‖ that ―the rule itself is certainly an 
unfortunate one.‖  JOHN NORTON POMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES 149 (1868).  See a fuller quotation and discussion of this section in infra note 240.  Barron was the 
problem to which Pomeroy indicated the Fourteenth Amendment provided a solution.  Further, both 
Paschal and Farrar were men of national reputation in 1866-68 and the fact that one may disagree with the 
manner through they arrived at  or support their conclusions is not a grounds for ignoring or attempting to 
diminish their conclusion as to the meaning of the Amendment.   See Aynes, supra note 31, at 83-94. 
      Professor Rosenthal also relies upon Cooley, but see supra note 118 (asking questions about Cooley‘s 
views  to which there is as of yet no answer).   
231
 POMEROY, supra note 230, at 150.  
232
 Id.  
233
 Id.  
234
 Id. In his hypothetical, Pomeroy‘s due process clause is paraphrased as ―declaring that no person shall 
be deprived of life, liberty, and property without due process of law.‖ Id.  
235
 While Pomeroy presents the facts as a hypothetical (―let us say that . . .‖), instances of both the statutes 
in question are undoubtedly drawn from real actions taken by the white elite who controlled the Johnson 
state governments.   
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forbids them ―to keep and bear them under certain penalties . . . .‖ 236  A second statute would 
require the same class to ―be hired out and to labor in a certain prescribed manner‖ or be 
―declared vagrants, and liable to be seized, and by a summary proceeding bound out to service for 
a term of years.‖ 237 
          Pomeroy then hypothesized an ―individual of the class‖ suffering some or all of the 
penalties and the individual ―insists that the statutes in question are opposed to the Bill of Rights 
in the state constitution. . . .‖  238  Pomeroy next assumed that the ―local courts settle the law 
against him‖ and hold the statutes complied with the state constitution, leaving the national courts 
bound by the decisions of the ―local judiciary.‖ 239 
     Pomeroy found this ―result‖ to be ―dismaying, that a ―remedy is needed‖, that one is ―easy and 
the question of its adoption is now pending before the people,‖ and then referred to section one of 
the Fourteenth Amendment by name.
240
 
     Given the use of the term ―class‖ and what looks to us like class-based discrimination, one 
might mistakenly believe that Pomeroy was talking about an equal protection violation.  But in 
setting up his hypothetical, Pomeroy did not write about a state equal protection clause, only the 
state constitutional provisions of the right to bear arms and due process.  Also his hypothetical on 
surrendering one‘s arms is coupled with the right to bear arms, and the labor regulations/summary 
proceeding issue is coupled with the due process clause.  Thus, there is no reason to believe 
Pomeroy was making an equal protection claim and every reason to believe that he was writing 
about the Fourteenth Amendment preventing the violation of the right to bear arms and due 
process.   
     In writing about the abuses that could occur with state courts enforcing only state created 
rights, Pomeroy wrote of this as a ―vast field open for injustice and oppression by individual 
states, which the nation has now no means of preventing.‖ 241  Then on the very next page, 
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 Id. at 150.  
237
 Id.  
238
 Id. (emphasis added).  
239
 Id. at 151.  
240
 Id. at 149, 151.  In talking about the ―rule of interpretation‖ of Barron v. Baltimore, Pomeroy indicated 
that while it is ―firmly established‖ that ―the rule itself is certainly an unfortunate one.  The United States, 
as the sovereign, as supreme over all state governments, should be able to afford complete protection to its 
citizens. It is not enough that this protection should be extended to citizens while abroad; it should be as 
power at home. The citizen should be guarded in the enjoyment of his civil rights of life, liberty, limb, and 
property, against the unequal and oppressive legislation of the states.  The Rule under consideration . . .  
effectively prevents the national courts from maintaining the rights of citizens against the encroachment of 
the states, as far as those rights are affected by positive restrictions.‖  Id. at 149. (emphasis added).  
241
 Id. at 150.  
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Pomeroy again spoke of ―injustice and oppression‖ 242 indicating that ―the proposed fourteenth 
amendment‖  would provide the ―nation with complete power to protect its citizens against local 
injustice and oppression . . . which beyond all doubt, should be conferred upon [the nation].‖243 
        Thus, like others who endorsed the Amendment, Pomeroy saw it was a means of providing 
double security for the rights of citizens—once by the state and a second time by the nation.  
V. 
Fairman, Frankfurter, Black; Berger and Curtis 
     In a prior work I have documented the overwhelming consensus that until 1949, the Slaughter-
House Cases and, in some instances, Cruikshank, were wrongly decided. 
244
  Some scholars 
praised that result and some condemned it, but there was at least a consensus on the result. 
245
  
Justice Hugo Black‘s dissent in Adamson v. California, 246  broke with the celebration of the 
nullification the Fourteenth Amendment.   
       It was Charles Fairman‘s work in 1949, with the help of Justice Frankfurter and Justice 
Jackson, that turned the tide of scholarship and developed a theoretical and claimed historical 
basis for what the Court did in Adamson and its prior decisions.  Ironically, at the same time 
Fairman was making such in-roads in the academic world, Justice Black was winning the battle in 
the Supreme Court for applying the Bill of Rights to the states.   
      In his article for this symposium, Professor Curtis accurately explains the hegemony that 
Professor Fairman and, later, his classmate and fellow Frankfurter student, Raoul Berger, 
exercised on this topic from 1949 until the mid-1980s. 
247
  As Professor Kurt Lash has indicated, 
Michael Kent Curtis‘ No State Shall Abridge  ―brought together the historical evidence in the 
most comprehensive and most persuasive way that had ever been done and pretty much put to rest 
much of the serious discussion about whether the Bill of Rights should ever be incorporated.  He 
had enormous impact‖ in academia.  248  In the words of Professor Randy Barnett, Curtis ―proved 
that the established conventional wisdom among academics was just wrong‖ 249 and Curtis 
became ―a hero in the subject.‖ 250  Professor Curtis‘ account of his involvement in research in 
this area and its evolution is contained in the first portion of his article in this symposium issue. 
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 Id. at 151.  
243
 Id.  
244
 See also Section IV of this article for illustrative quotations to support that view.  
245
 Aynes, supra note 9, at 681-686.  
246
 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947).  
247
 Curtis, supra note ____, at ___. {JCLI at 2-7}  Raoul Berger‘s primary work was his book RAOUL 
BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOUREENTH AMEMDENT (1977).  He 
published many articles on the subject and published a second edition of this book in 1997.  
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 Discussion, 56 DRAKE L. REV. 1009 (2008). 
249
 Id. at 1010.  
250
 Id. 
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251
 There have, of course, been other important scholarly contributions to the development of our 
understanding in this area. 
252
 
VII. 
George Thomas and Bryan Wildenthal 
            The discussion between George C. Thomas III and Bryan Wildenthal in many ways 
represents academia at its best.  Unlike Charles Fairman, who identified W. W. Crosskey at an 
AALS Annual Meeting by his name tag, but purposely avoided having any conversation with 
him, 
253
  their writings in the Ohio State Law Journal
254
 , e-mail exchanges, and interaction at the 
conference in San Diego, have involved polite and congenial exchanges by people of good will 
who nevertheless make clear their points of disagreement.  This is heartening.  
       Professor Thomas‘ pursuit of the many on-line newspapers from the 19th Century is a step in 
the right direction.  Indeed, at the University of Akron School of Law Constitutional Law Center 
—one of four such centers created by the U.S. Congress in commemoration of the bi-centennial 
of the U.S. Constitution in 1987— we have begun ―The 39th Congress Project.‖  This project is 
designed to produce more biographical information about the many members of the 39
th
 Congress 
and locate their out-of-Congress speeches on the Fourteenth Amendment and other relevant 
issues. 
255
  The hope is that over time, law students will utilize the rich on-line resources to help 
create biographical sketches that will help enrich our understanding of what these Congressmen 
were doing and thinking.  Professor Thomas has graciously agreed to participate in this project 
and I would welcome others who would be willing to do so. 
256
  I applaud Professor Thomas for 
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 Michael Kent Curtis, The Bill of Rights and the States: An Overview from One Perspective, __-___ 
{JCLI 1-5}.  
252
 This includes, of course, the individuals I have cited and many others too numerous to mention. 
253
 Aynes, supra note 9, at 1249-1250 ; see also the less than temperate remarks exchanged between 
Fairman and Crosskey in print.  Id. at 1255 and n.386.  
254
 Bryan Wildenthal, Nationalizing the Bill of Rights: Revisiting the Original Understanding of the 
Fourteenth Amendment in 1866–67, 68 OHIO ST. L. J. 1509 (2007); George C. Thomas III, The Riddle of 
the Fourteenth Amendment: A Response to Professor Wildenthal, 68 OHIO ST. L. J. 1727 (2007).  
255
 The web site, http://www.uakron.edu/law/constitutionallaw/39thcongressproject.php, currently contains 
the paper for Robin Lau (J.D. May 2009) on Congressman James M. Ashley (R-Ohio).  A request to post 
an additional paper on Thaddeus Stevens (R-Pa.) has been made.  Papers are currently being written on 
Rufus Spalding (R-Ohio), John Bingham‘s (R-Ohio) role in the creation of West Virginia, and James A. 
Garfield (R-Ohio).  
256
 The approach is to try to obtain ―support‖ from ―participating‖ law faculty members who might offer 
advanced seminars in constitutional law, legal history or some related area.  If we had only 100 
participating professors and they gave their students the option of writing a paper on some member of the 
39
th
 Congress that would be a great start.  If even one student in the classes of a one-fourth of the 100 
participating professors wrote an article each year, that would produce 25 new biographical sketches that 
could be added to the Center‘s web site for use by all scholars.  Others who would like to participate in this 
project can contact me at raynes@uakron.edu.  
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his important effort at beginning the discovery of relevant newspaper articles which would help 
everyone who has an interest in the area.   
     At the same time, in my view is Professor Thomas‘ pioneering efforts are only a tentative first 
step and have not yet matured to the point where one can draw conclusions from his effort.  
Though they cannot be exhaustive, set forth below are three reasons for this conclusion.  
A. 
Better than Newspapers 
             To be sure, newspaper accounts would be one way in which politically active people who 
were elected to the legislature would obtain their information. 
257
  But this is not the only, or even 
the primary, source.  
            Personal contact would be the best.  Over the years Congressmen worked closely with 
local members of the state legislature and other local officials.  For an individual who had to run 
for re-election, personal contact with local officials was crucial.  Such contact might include not 
only face-to-face meetings, but letters and other mailings from Washington.  Moreover, all 
Congressmen had a motive to keep in close contact with their allies in the legislature to be re-
elected and because the legislature itself elected the U.S. Senators.  
             In addition, the voters would have ample opportunity to hear the views of the 
Congressmen by listening to their speeches.  For example, we are told that Congressman James 
Garfield made over fifty speeches during the 1860 presidential campaign. 
258
  The account of the 
adoption of the original Constitution is no doubt applicable to the Amendment as well: ―There 
were hundreds, perhaps thousands, of local elections for which there are probably no extant 
records.‖ 259  
             Further, we know that during this era many people had their own subscription to the 
Congressional Globe and followed the debates of Congress through the Globe, thus giving them 
knowledge independent of the newspapers.
260
  The Congressmen themselves were provided with 
not only their own copy of the Globe, but with twenty-four extra copies 
261
 which they apparently 
gave to political allies.  Thus, with a Congress of 235 members, there were 5,640 copies of the 
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 Professor Thomas believes that ―busy‖ members of the legislature would not follow the debates in 
Congress. But I want to suggest just the opposite. The position of a state legislator was not considered a 
full-time job and the legislative sessions were much shorter than today.  
258
 THEODORE CLARKE SMITH, THE LIFE AND LETTERS OF JAMES ABRAM GARFIELD 150-152 (1925).   
259
  Raoul Berger, Original Intent and Boris Bittker, 66 IND. L. J. 723, 742 (1991).  
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 Two individuals who followed the actions of Congress with particular care were Justice Miller and 
Chief Justice Chase.  Aynes, supra note 176 at 660-661 (examples of Miller following Congress closely); I  
SALMON P. CHASE PAPERS 610 (John Niven ed., 1993) (example of his knowing of a ―great speech‖ that 
Bingham gave that very day). 
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 TREFOUSSE, supra note 69, at 39.  
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Globe that could be distributed to their political allies.  This is more than enough copies for each 
member of Congress to distribute to the state legislative members whose districts overlapped with 
his own.  Thus the entire legislature could have been covered, if they so desired. 
262
    
 
We know that as early as the 1780s, pamphlets, newspaper reporters, speeches, and letters 
―bombarded the voters.‖ 263  We also know that thousands of ―reprints‖ of the speeches of 
Congressmen were sent to constituents and others, by the speaker, by other congressmen, and by 
political parties.  During General William T. Sherman‘s Atlanta campaign, as the 1864 
Presidential election approached, ―[p]amphlets of political speeches flooded the camp . . . .‖ 264    
         The use of pamphlets was a critical part of political communication during the Civil War 
and Reconstruction area.  In speaking of Secretary of War Edwin Stanton, historian T. Harry 
Williams pointed out the importance of this form of communication and tied it to the ability of 
government officials, including Congressmen, to ―frank‖ the documents to key political players:  
            Pamphlet writers formed an essential part of Stanton‘s propaganda machine.  
              He knew the efficiency of this medium of dissemination in an America which  
              read avidly all the political documents franked out of Washington. 
265
 
An example of this practice is found in a letter from James G. Blaine (R-Maine) to Israel 
Washburn (R-Ill.) reporting in 1856 that Blaine was present when ―five or six bushels‖ of franked 
reports from T. J. D. Fuller (D-Maine) were brought into the post office. 
266
  These pamphlets 
were often circulated in large numbers.  For example, after President Johnson vetoed the 
Freedman‘s Bureau bill, Congressman John Lynch (R-Maine) indicated that 100,000 copies of 
Senator Trumbull‘s (R-Ill.) reply would be ―sent to the Country.‖ 267  When the Report of the 
Joint Committee on Reconstruction was completed, 150,000 copies were distributed across the 
nation.  This was a larger number than the subscriptions to most newspapers. 
268
  During this era, 
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 Professor Thomas also claims that the ―average state legislator‖ would not have read the speeches of 
Bingham and, assumptively, of other Congressmen like Howard.  Thomas, supra note ___, at 41.  Again, 
this is the application of 21
st
 century views to 19
th
 century reality.  In this age before electricity and all the 
technology which occupies our time, the people of the 19
th
 century focused upon politics, court 
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 Burger, supra note 259, at 742.  
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it was common for individuals to correspond about having received and read such pamphlets
269
 or 
for people to write a speaker and request copies of a speech. 
270
 
                One such pamphlet that received widespread circulation was Bingham‘s Fourteenth 
Amendment speech of February 25, 1866 with the title ―In support of the proposed amendment to 
enforce the Bill of Rights.‖271  Sometimes the speeches of multiple speakers were re-printed 
together. 
272
  Again, these reached the hands of common voters and politically active people like 
members of the legislature and other office-holders.  Indeed, by its private printing and mailing, 
newspaper accounts, and printing in pamphlet form by various organizations, it is estimated that 
President Lincoln‘s letter to Erastus Corning on the military arrest of former Congressman 
Clement Vallandigham ―at least 500,000 copies‖ of the letter ―were read by 10,000,000 people.‖ 
273
 
                This was also a day in which leaders could influence others privately.  According to 
historian Harold Hyman, Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase believed that both the Thirteenth and the 
Fourteenth Amendments enforced the Bill of Rights against the states. 
274
  In Chase‘s diary entry 
of May 10, 1866, he made reference to Bingham‘s ―great speech‖ of that afternoon. 275  Later, 
Chase indicated that he urged white southern leaders to make the adoption of the Fourteenth 
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274
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136 (Kermit Hall ed., 1992);  see also Curtis, supra note 76 at 48 (―Republicans believed that the 
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 I THE SALMON P. CHASE PAPERS 610 (John Niven ed., 1993).  Chase‘s beliefs on the application of the 
Bill of Rights to the states – something that should not be surprising given Chase‘s civil rights activity and 
the fact that we know he followed Bingham‘s speeches in the Congress – it is doubtful he would join the 
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Amendment the platform for the 1866 campaign and the ―true policy‖ for the south. 276  This is 
just one example of how the speeches that might not be published in southern papers, might 
nevertheless have influence upon southern representatives.  
                 Thus, while we can appreciate the importance of newspapers, we ought not to forget 
that there were other and, at times, more effective ways for members of state legislatures to 
receive information about the views of Congress on the Fourteenth Amendment.  None of these 
other options are considered in Professor Thomas‘ article.  
                                                                         B.  
                                                       The Importance of Context  
           When sociologist Pamela Brandwein examined the debate by Fairman and Crosskey over 
the Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights, she concluded that the ―lens‖ or ―frame‖ from 
which Fairman viewed the debates hindered Fairman‘s ability ―to bracket (or historicize) the 
orthodoxy his own era produced‖ and produced misconceptions about what he read.277  This same 
phenomena is illustrated in Professor Thomas puzzlement on his allegation that Senator Howard‘s 
―speech was ignored in the Senate chamber . . . .‖ 278  In fact, exactly the opposite was true, and 
Professor Wildenthal is correct that the lack of any meaningful response is a testimony to the 
acceptance and impact of the speech.
279
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 CHASE, supra note 275, at 632 (Sept. 5, 1866, including Governor Hamilton of Texas and Louisiana 
Republican Durant) and 640 (Sept. 25, 1866, former U.S. and Confederate Congressman William W. 
Boyce of South Carolina and Dr. Duperioer, who I have not been able to identify).   
277
 PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RECONSTRUCTING RECONSTRUCTION, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
PRODUCTION OF HISTORICAL TRUTH 128 (1999).  
278
 Thomas, supra note ___, at 9. In my view, some of the newspaper articles are read in a modern context 
and without the context of the 19
th
 Century through which its original readers would have lived.  However, 
I will defer discussion of these until the project moves further along and use the treatment of Senator 
Howard as an illustration.   
279
 Instead of disputing the statements Howard made on behalf of the Joint Committee, those who oppose 
the enforcement of the Bill of Rights against the states often attempt to discredit Howard in some way. 
Because Howard was a ―radical‖, for that reason alone Berger thought that Howard unworthy of belief.  As 
an example of his untrustworthiness Berger noted that Howard (like Lincoln) advocated that at least some 
African Americans should be allowed to vote.  Berger, supra note 247, at 147.  George Thomas says that 
Howard‘s ―remarks were very late in the process and no one picked up the incorporation banter, either to 
embrace or criticize it.‖  Thomas, supra note ___, at {pre-conference draft. 6.}.   
 
     Yet, Howard‘s speech was the very first to be given on the Amendment in the Senate. CONG. GLOBE, 
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2764 (May 23, 1866).  One must respectfully wonder how any speech in the Senate 
could have ―come too late‖, let alone the opening speech by the person designated as the floor manager.  
The debate in the Senate was not concluded until 15 days later, on June 8, 1866. Charles Fairman, Does the 
Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5, 135 (1949).  The first state to 
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                  Fessenden and Howard were long-time colleagues, having served together as Whig 
members of the House of Representatives together in 1840-41.
280
  One of the joint projects on 
which Fessenden and Howard worked in 1841 was the Joint Committee of Congress to 
commemorate the death of President William Henry Harrison.
281
  Howard was personally chosen 
by Senator Fessenden to make the presentation on the floor of the Senate and, contrary to claims 
by some who would undermine Howard‘s speech, Fessenden was actually in the Senate listening 
to Howard‘s presentation. 282  
            Further, when Jacob M. Howard spoke on the Fourteenth Amendment, he was not 
speaking as an individual member of the Senate, no matter how influential.  Rather, he was a 
                                                                                                                                                 
ratify the Amendment was Connecticut in June 1866 and the Amendment was not declared ratified until 
Congress‘ resolution July 21, 1868 and Secretary of State Sewart‘s proclamation of July 28, 1868.  It is not 
self-evident why a speech on the meaning of an amendment that was not ratified until over two years later 
was or could be ―too late.‖  
 
Indeed, Chairman Fessenden obviously reached the opposite conclusion of Professor Thomas, 
because in an exchange with Senator Sumner right before Howard's speech, Fessenden indicated that after 
the House had passed the proposal ―I thought it well. . . [that it] should lie upon the table for awhile in order 
to give the gentlemen ample opportunity to consider it . . .‖ CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2768 
(1866).  
  
280
 Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, 1774-Present, available at 
bioguide.congress.gov/biosearch/biosearch.asp. 
281
 BANGOR DAILY WHIG & COURIER, (Bangor, Maine), Jan. 3, 1866, col. C.  
282
 FRANCIS FESSENDEN, LIFE AND PUBLIC SERVICE OF WILLIAM PITT FESSENDEN 61-62 (1907) (―…Mr. 
Fessenden . . . gave the amendment to the charge of Senator Howard.‖) (―Mr. Fessenden was in his seat and 
participated in the debate, explaining why some of the amendments were thought necessary.‖).  Of course, 
Fessenden could have chosen from the Joint Committee Senator James Grimes (R-Iowa), George W. 
Williams (R-Or.), Justin Morrill (R-Vt.) or Ira Harris (R-N.Y.) to make the presentation, but did not do so.   
 
On Fessenden‘s presence in the Senate during the debates see also CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 
2761 (casting a vote on an amendment to a bill to authorize the building of a railroad bridge between 
Wisconsin and Minnesota), 2762 (asking Senator Henderson two  questions on two different occasions 
about the same bill) and 2763 (noting his disagreement with Senator Sumner about the propriety of taking 
up the discussion on the Fourteenth Amendment and making a statement on the process which fills two 
columns of the Globe) (May 23,1866).  It should be noted that the two-column statement of Senator 
Fessenden is only approximately two columns before Senator Howard began his speech.  Id. at 2764. 
Further,  Chairman Fessenden indicated that he might take part in the debate, but that it would ―depend 
on circumstances not entirely within my control.‖  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2768 (1866).   
 
We all make mistakes. While I do not doubt that the inference that Fessenden was not present in the Senate, 
drawn from Howard‘s speech, and the oversight in not reading the portion of the Globe just two columns 
before Howard‘s speech showing that Fessenden was present in the Senate were mistakes made in complete 
good faith, I do think they show the hazards of selectively reading the Globe and of relying upon inferences 
without checking to see whether there are facts which confirm or refute the inference.    
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member of the Joint Committee of Fifteen on Reconstruction and speaking on behalf of the Joint 
Committee.  War hero, General, Congressman and future President James A. Garfield called the 
people on the Joint Committee ―the truest and best men in Congress. . . .‖  283   
            Howard‘s role as spokesman for the Committee is confirmed by the content of the speech 
itself.  Even a cursory look at the Journal of the Joint Committee reveals that while Howard 
ultimately supported reporting the entire Amendment to the Congress, in the behind-the-scenes 
struggle over its content he was not a champion of Section 1 and, in fact, frequently voted against 
it.  This was Bingham‘s proposal and the fact that Howard‘s discussion is supportive of and 
consistent with Bingham‘s account in the House is evidence that Howard was being faithful to 
what was discussed and agreed upon in the Joint Committee.    
            In support of Howard‘s accuracy and honesty, it should be noted that he was a ―respected‖ 
member of the Senate 
284
 and that he openly pointed out on the floor his disappointment at not 
being able obtain at least some limited provision for voting by African American males. 
285
          
Howard‘s standing in the Senate is also shown by the amendment of the Amendment in the 
Senate.  Rather than moving into obscurity, one of the first things that happened after Howard‘s 
speech was that the Republicans chose him for another leadership role regarding the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  After various Republican caucuses in which the Amendment was discussed, 
Howard, Fessenden, and James W. Grimes (R-Iowa) were designated as a committee of three to 
prepare the proposals based upon the discussion in the caucus. 
286
  It was caucus leader Benjamin 
Wade (R-Ohio) who made the initial motion to add a citizenship clause. 
287
  But Howard (R-
Mich.) had a different view and it was Howard‘s view that prevailed over the leader of the 
Republican caucus. 
288
  Fessenden also took an active role, obtaining the addition of the words ―or 
naturalized‖ to the citizenship clause. 289  
            These post-caucus proceedings show Howard‘s standing in the Senate, and equally as 
important, Fessenden‘s willingness to intervene if he disagreed with Howard.  Yet, there was no 
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 ―Speech of the Hon. J. A. Garfield, of Ohio‖, CAMPAIGN SPEECHES, supra note 63, at 18 (Toledo, Aug. 
22, 1866).  He was probably referring only to the Republican members. 
284
 MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, A COMPROMISE OF PRINCIPLE 184 (1974).  
285
 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong.,1st Sess. 2265 (May 23, 1866).  
286
 BENEDICTsupra note 284, at 184-85.  
287
  Id. at 185-187.  An account of the views that the citizenship clause was merely declaratory of what the 
law was and the role and view of various Senators in amending the Amendment is found in Richard L. 
Aynes, Unintended Consequences of the Fourteenth Amendment in UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 110-140 (David E. Kyvig ed., 2000).  For an updated version see Richard 
L. Aynes, Unintended Consequences of the Fourteenth Amendment and What they tell us about its 
interpretation, 39 AKRON L. REV. 289, 290-300 (2006).   
288
 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2764-65 (May 23, 1866).   
289
 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3040 (June 8, 1866).   
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intervention by Fessenden on Howard‘s description of the meaning of the privileges or 
immunities clause.  If this was a matter of discussion in the Republican caucus, it must have been 
satisfactory because there were no post-caucus discussions, no clarification or disavowal of 
Howard‘s speech and no proposed amendment with respect to the privileges or immunities 
clause, like there was with other portions of proposed Amendment.
290
  Because the Amendment 
avoided all radical proposals and was the product of the moderates, it became the basis upon 
which all members of the Party could rally around. 
291
  Except for the portions amended in the 
Senate, there was simply nothing controversial in the proposal and no reason for extended 
discussion.  
            Professor Thomas also claims there was no response to Howard‘s views.  In this claim 
Professor Thomas has inadvertently fallen into error because Howard‘s views were disputed by at 
least two Senators, Reverdy Johnson (D-Md.) and Senator Thomas A. Hendricks  
(D-Ind.). 
292
  I will focus upon Senator Reverdy Johnson (D-Md.) who had represented the 
slaveholder in Dred Scott, and in the Joint Committee voted against reporting out the 
                                                 
290
 Professor Thomas appears to look for a chorus of Senator who will stand up and say ―me too‖ to 
Howard‘s speech.  Thomas, supra note ___, at ___  {JCLI 16}(Howard‘s speech ―dropped into the pond . . 
. without leaving a ripple.‖).  But this is not how the legislative process worked.  Howard spoke for the 
entire Join Committee, including its Chairman Senator Fessenden and four other members of the Senate, 
excluding Senator Johnson (D-Md.).  Their unanimous support for the Amendment in the Joint Committee 
needed no further statements beyond their votes in the Senate which were also unanimous. The votes of the 
entire Senate was also overwhelming, 33-11, with five Senators absent.  Of those absent, only one was a 
Republican.   
291
 Aynes, supra note 56, at 385.  
292
 Professor Rosenthal cites speeches from three Democratic opponents of the amendment (without 
indicating that they were Democrats), Senator Johnson (D-Md.), Senator Thomas A.  Hendricks (D-Ind.), 
and Representative William W. Boyer (D-Pa.) citing. as authority George C. Thomas III, The Riddle of the 
Fourteenth Amendment: A Response to Professor Wildenthal,  68 OHIO ST. L, J. 1627, 1633, 1646 (2007). 
In the revision made between the conference and the final article Professor Thomas tries to make his 
statements consistent by asserting that there was a difference between Senator Johnson and Senator 
Hendricks claiming they did not ―understand‖ the meaning of the Amendment and ―responding to 
Howard‘s theory.‖ Thomas, supra note ___  at ___. {JCLI at 14 of the draft.}  
While this is an interesting approach, it is flawed for on at least fourth separate grounds.  
First, as set forth in the text to follow, this was not the ―theory‖ of Senator Howard, but rather the 
understating of the meaning of the privileges or immunities clause by the Republican members of the Joint 
committee – the leaders and most influential members of the Senate and the House.  
Second, as developed in the text, there is substantial pre and post amendment evidence to suggest that 
Johnson did understand the meaning of the amendment in the same way that Howard articulated it and 
Johnson was simply being untruthful in his statements on the Senate floor.  
Third, Johnson‘s claim is clearly inconsistent with the explanation given by Howard. If Thomas‘ view of 
the legislative  process were true, then anyone opposed to an amendment could help defeat its avowed 
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Amendment. 
293
  In a June 8, 1866 speech Senator Johnson professed support for the citizenship 
clause and the due process clause. 
294
  He made no mention of the equal protection clause, but he 
opposed the privileges or immunities clause upon the claimed ground that ―I do not understand 
what will be the effect of that.‖ 295  As Professor Wildenthal documents, Senator Johnson moved 
to strike the clause from the Amendment and his views were not even considered worthy of 
debate or a roll-call vote in rejecting the motion. 
296
 
          This is particularly interesting for multiple reasons.  First, like President Johnson who 
helped to sponsor, along with some of his appointed Provisional Governors, a short-lived 
conservative counter-Fourteenth Amendment whose primary changes were to the privileges or 
immunities clause, Senator Johnson apparently had a real fear of that clause.  Thus, we see a 
convergence between leading opponents (President Johnson, Senator Johnson, leading anti-war 
Democrat Vallandigham, as well as the Provisional Governors under President Johnson) of the 
privileges and immunities clause and the proponents of the clause in Congress who all saw it as 
an important portion of Section 1. 
297
  How much sense does it make to ignore and treat as a 
nullity the key provision of the Amendment?  
        Second, we have to take Johnson‘s claim to ―not understand‖ its effect with a large amount 
of skepticism.  In part, this is because he not only heard Howard‘s speech but he undoubtedly 
heard Bingham and others discuss the effect in the Joint Committee.  Further, because Johnson 
argued Dred Scott he knew of the Chief Justice‘s conclusion that if African Americans were U.S. 
Citizens, their privilege and immunities under Article IV would give them ―the full liberty of 
speech in public and in private upon all subjects upon which its own citizens might speak; to hold 
                                                                                                                                                 
intent by simply arguing against the amendment without specifically recognizing the arguments for the 
amendment. This is contrary to common usage and common sense.  
Fourth. Johnson clearly did not speak for the Joint Committee on Reconstruction. He was in the distinct 
minority that voted against reporting out the amendment. He clearly did not speak for the Senate, because 
he was in the distinct minority that voted against the Amendment and his weak attempt to amendthe 
Amendment by deleting the privileges and immunities clause was an utter failure, not even warranting 
debate or a roll call vote.  In contrast, Howard spoke for the Joint Committee.  Professor Thomas is willing 
to embrace the view of Johnson – even though no one else in the Senate mentioned Johnson by name or did 
an analysis his speech. Yet, he argues that in spite of his leadership position, Howard‘s views were ignored 
because no one said ―amen‖ to Howard‘s speech. One would think that an even-handed approach, at the 
very least, would be that Howard and Johnson would be treated equally and, more logically, that Howard‘s 
leadership position as the floor manager with Fessenden‘s blessing should count for more than Johnson‘s 
isolated views. 
293
 KENDRICK, supra note 268, at 114. 
294
 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3041 (June 8, 1866).   
295
 Id.  
296
 Wildenthal, supra note 4,  at ____.  {JCLI at 143 and n. 486}  
297
 Professor Thomas thinks this is true as well.  Thomas, supra note ___, at ___.  {manuscript at 30}  
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public meetings upon political affairs, and to keep and carry arms wherever they went.‖ 298  This 
is confirmed by Senator Johnson‘s post-ratification action when he frequently represented KKK 
terrorists and Democrats opposed to Republicans and republican governments; he conceded that 
the privileges and immunities clause included the right to bear arms. 
299
              
C. 
Significant Methodology problems 
    Professor Thomas has appropriately indicated that we really cannot evaluate the newspaper 
articles until we have read the actual article. 
300
  Yet, he is candid in his indication:  ―I am not sure 
how accurate the search engines are.  On occasion, I would get a different number of hits when 
running the very same search.‖ 301   
                 Inaccurate search engines are not an overwhelming obstacle if one is simply looking 
for relevant articles.  Even if one misses a few articles or has to do the search multiple times, 
important findings can still be made.  Indeed, Professor Thomas has already identified and 
summarized some articles in which many people working in the Fourteenth Amendment area will 
have an interest.  This is significant contribution. 
               However, there is a difference between finding articles of interest and trying to prove a 
negative by indicating that there are no (or few) relevant newspaper stories.  In order to do the 
latter, the search— like a scientific experiment— must be capable of replication by others.  If 
Professor Thomas himself cannot always replicate his own study, it seems unlikely that others 
can do so.  
             Of even greater importance, Professor Thomas has misapprehended the nature of the data 
base he is searching. 
302
  Professor Thomas indicates that the data base he used contained 3,306 
newspapers. 
303
  He believes the number of newspapers searched is important (as it is), because he 
mentions, a second time, that he searched a data base that has ―over 3,000 newspapers.‖304 A 
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 Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 417 (1857).  
299
 Aynes, supra note 31, at 98 n.263.  It is possible, of course, that Senator Johnson was referring to not 
knowing the meaning and effect of the non-Bill of Rights privileges and immunities.  But, if so, that does 
not support Professor Thomas‘s analysis.  
 
300
 Thomas, supra note __, at __.  [JCLI 3] I have invited Professor Thomas to send me copies of the 
newspapers he uses so that, if there are no copyright issues, they can be scanned and placed upon the ―39 th 
Congress Project‖ web site for all to use.  
301
  Thomas, supra note ___, at 6. {January 22
, 
2009 paper} In the conference presented at the University 
of San Diego, the most questions for the panel on which Professor Thomas, Professor Wildenthal and I 
participated, were about Professor Thomas‘s  search technique.  But I set those to one side given the 
nascent nature of the project and assume if there is any concern, it will be addressed in the future.  
302
 This is newspaperarchieve.com   
303
 Thomas, supra note ___, at (1/22/09 version at 6).  
304
 Thomas, supra note ___, at ___ {1/22/09 version at 33}  
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history of newspapers indicates that there were 3,000 newspapers in the U.S. in 1860 and 4,500 in 
1870.
305
  This might lead one to unthinkingly conclude that the data base utilized contained 
almost 74% of all the available newspapers in 1870 or 110% in 1860. 
306
  The latter impossibility 
should be a warning to alert everyone to the fact that there are significant methodological 
problems.  
            The methodological problems begin with the fact that the data base does not limit its 
journals to the key times of 1866–1868 or even the Civil War and Reconstruction era.  Rather the 
data base covers two hundred fifty years (1759 to 2009) and it includes newspapers from eight 
foreign countries. 
307
  We do not know how many of those newspapers were in existence in the 
key time-period for us (whichever time period we choose
308
).  This is the profile with which I was 
provided:   
               *They claim to have at least one publication from 3315 newspapers (spanning 1759- 
                    2009); 
                *They have at least one publication for 161 U.S. newspapers in 1860; 
                *They have at least one publication for 84 U.S. newspapers in 1868; and 
                *They have at least one publication for 260 U.S. newspapers in 1900.  
 
If we take the number of newspapers in the data base for 1860 and use the papers estimated to 
exist in 1860, Professor Thomas has only searched 5.4% of the newspapers.
309
  If we use the 
number of newspapers in the data base for 1868 and the number of newspapers in existence in 
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 Mitchell Stephens, History of Newspapers (for Collier‘s Encyclopedia) 
http://www.nyu.edu/classes/stephens/Collier%27s%20page.htm (last observed June 5, 2009).  Crosskey, 
supra note 11, at 101, indicates that there were 4,967 newspapers in 1870, citing HUDSON, JOURNALISM IN 
THE UNITED STATES 771 (1873). 
306
 We know, of course, this is impossible.  
307
 I appreciate the work of Assistant Law Librarian Annette Souare and her assistants in conducting this 
research.  At the time they did the search the number of newspapers had increased to 3,315.  The good 
news appears to be that this data base appears to continue to grow.  A printout made on March 6, 2009 
indicates that there are nine newspapers from Canada, one from Denmark, one from Ireland, eight from 
Jamaica, one from South Africa, ten from the United Kingdom, and one from the Virgin Islands.  
308
 I would, of course, choose 1866-1868.  See supra note 296 {This is not the correct fn. in the version 
sent to me and may have been changed by my changes in this new version.}.  I realize others may 
choose different time period.  But the question is the same for each time period: what is the universe of 
newspapers in the data base for that time period?  
309
 I realize that the number of newspapers could change over a period of years.  For example, if I read 
Professor Thomas‘ paper correctly, he has cited newspapers for a five year period: 1865-1869.  We do not 
know how many total newspapers were available in the data base during that period.  We cannot simply 
multiply the 1868 number by five, because new newspapers were founded and old newspapers went out of 
business.  Multiplying the 1868 number would probably inflate the number of relevant newspapers 
Professor Thomas has consulted.  For example, if 50 of those 68 papers were in existence for all five years 
Professor Thomas surveyed, to multiply the 68 papers times 5 would count the same fifty papers as if they 
were 250 papers.  In any event, since this is his study, the task of identifying the total number of relevant 
time-period newspapers he has surveyed is his task, given that he wants to use them to prove the absence of 
coverage.  
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1870, he has only searched 1.9% of the newspapers. 
310
  In fact, however, we do not know and it 
appears that Professor Thomas does not know how many relevant newspapers he has been 
actually searching.  This explains why he is not finding articles which have been found through 
normal research or articles in important papers that we know exist.  It also means that we cannot 
rely upon the absence of documents in his search to support his claim.   
     In sum, while this is an interesting first effort, it is still in its nascent stage and until more 
comprehensive searches can be conducted, the searches can be replicated, and the methodology 
issues can be resolved, it is premature to place any reliance on the current results.   
                                                                        VII. 
                                     Professor Donald Dripps and the Grand Jury  
            Professor Dripps tells an interesting tale about the ―first criminal law revolution‖ and 
there is no doubt that at the core, this is an important part of our legal history.
311
  And yet, it 
hardly seems to support the weight he would put upon it.   
            He combines in this ―first revolution‖ three components: the grand jury (―an 
anachronism‖), the privilege against self-incrimination, and the party incapacity rule. 312  But if 
one thinks about this ―revolution‖ one must conclude that it was a pretty feeble one.  Yes, the 
party incapacity rule was abolished in the federal courts as well as the state courts.  But the grand 
jury requirement and the right against self-incrimination are still safely protected by the Fifth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.  Thus, ―the anachronism‖ still lives on more than two 
hundred years after the Fifth Amendment was adopted and more than one hundred forty years 
after the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified.  At the very least, we know this was not a 
successful national revolution.  Nor was any movement against the right against self-
incrimination successful.  According to Professor Kenneth Katkin:  
                  Since the earliest days of the Republic, the constitutions of all but two states 
                  also have always expressly protected the right of individuals against compelled  
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 If we use the number of newspapers identified by Crosskey, 4,967 in 1870, and compare it to the 
number of newspapers for 1868 in the database used by Professor Thomas, then the percentage of 
newspapers at which he has searched falls to 1.3%.   
311
 Donald A. Dripps,  The Fourteenth Amendment, the Bill of Rights, and the (First) Criminal Procedure 
Revolution, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES___  (2009).                        
312
 Dripps, supra note 311, at 5.  He claims, in part, that the ―[p]olice assumed the investigative functions of 
the jp, and public prosecutors took over the charging process from the grand jury.‖  Id. This is said to have 
been caused by increasing urbanization.  Yet the census records for 1870 indicate the rural population of 
the U.S. was 74.3% .  Without more information, the overwhelming rural population suggests that 
urbanization cannot have been the cause of any change or the change was very small.  See U. S. Census, 
Table 4, Population: 1790-1990, available at 
http://www.census.gov/population/www/censusdata/files/table-4.pdf.   
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                  self-incriminations.  Moreover, both of the states that lack express constitution  
                  provisions [Iowa and New Jersey] also have protected the right against self- 
                  incrimination continuously since  before the Civil War. 
313
 
              No doubt articles will continue to be written about the need to abolish or reform the 
grand jury.  But the issue does not seem to have ―caught fire.‖  Where is the national movement 
to abolish the federal grand jury provisions?  Was this even mentioned in the 2008 elections?  
         Further, if we look to the relevant time period (1866-68), it is clear that the number of states 
interested in avoiding the grand jury was a distinct and slender minority.  According to Dripps, 
the ―first victory for Bentham reformers‖ seeking to dispense with the grand jury came in 
Michigan when a statute to that effect was adopted in 1859.
314
  If I read Professor Dripp‘s paper 
correctly, while some others may have removed their Grand Jury requirement, no other state 
authorized proceeding without a grand jury until 1868 when Kansas passed a statute permitting 
prosecutors to proceed by information.
315
  Thus, at best, this mini-revolution was engaged in by 
only two of the thirty-seven
316
 states at the time.  
      Even that has to be qualified, because Senator Howard, the former Attorney General of 
Michigan (1856-1861), supported the enforcement of the Bill of Rights against the states, even 
though he must have known of Michigan‘s alternative procedure.  This is consistent with Bryan 
Wildenthal‘s point that treatise writers who did not like the grand jury would nevertheless support 
incorporation because having a grand jury was clearly a much lesser evil than not passing the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
317
  For example, in Ohio, even though the voters had previously rejected 
a complicated provision which would have given the right to vote to African American males, its 
Congressional delegation joined in proposing the Fifteenth Amendment and the Ohio Legislature 
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 Kenneth Katkin, Fourteenth Amendment ―Incorporation‖ of the Criminal Procedure Amendments: The 
View From the States, 84 NEB. L. REV. 397, 431-32 (2005).  As Professor Dripps points out, because of the 
prevalence of the incapacity rule, there was no comment upon silence issue.  But the ―revolution‖ seems to 
have suffered a serious set back in 1878—when it was supposed to be going strong— by the adoption of a 
no comment rule by the Congress.  See id. at 435 n.187 (citing 20 Stat. 30, Ch 37 (1878)).  Further, at the 
time Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (overruling Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947)),  was 
decided, states had the approval of the Supreme Court to comment upon an individual‘s invocation of the 
right, but forty-four states prohibited this and only six states allowed it.  Id. at 435.   
 
314
 Dripps, supra note 311, at 7.  
315
 Dripps, supra note 311, at 11 n.52.  Kansas ratified the Fourteenth Amendment on January 11, 1867.  
Thus, the 1868 statute was passed after Kansas has ratified, but we do not know if the statute was passed 
before the amendment was actually adopted by the requisite number of states.  While Dripps includes other 
states with later adoptions, it should be noted that California did not ratify the Fourteenth Amendment until 
1959.  
316
 I have included in the total number of states —Texas, Mississippi and Virginia—which were not 
represented in Congress during the 1868 Presidential Election.   
317
 Wildenthal, supra note 4, at ____. {JCLI at 47-51, 63, 78-79, and 83-84 }   
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ratified that Amendment in 1870.  Senator Howard was apparently willing to do the same with 
respect to the grand jury.  Unlike the ―revolution‖ against the prohibition amendment and the 
―revolution‖ against the party incapacity rule, the ―revolution‖ against the protection against self-
incrimination and the use of the grand jury was largely quashed.   
         I realize that many care deeply about the grand jury (or grand jury abuse) and I would 
assume most of the attendees at the conference would prefer that it not exist because it is 
commonly viewed as an unfair tool of the prosecutor.  Nevertheless, I want to gently suggest that 
compared to the avoiding another war in which 620,000 lives were lost, allowing the former 
rebels to combine with Democrats to secure the fruits of the war, risking monetary claims of $1.6-
2 billion by former rebels for emancipated slaves,
318
 risking the taxation of loyal Southern 
Unionists to help pay a rebel debt of $ 3 billion, 
319
 and a host of other matters covered by the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the question of whether one has a grand jury or not is a minor and even 
unimportant matter, which pales into insignificance.
320
    
Indeed, if one thinks about this for a while, it should be clear that the grand jury was 
never an important issue in the minds of the voters.  The average adult voter will be called for 
jury duty, even if they do not ultimately serve.  But the average adult can live his/her whole life 
without having any contact with the grand jury.  The average adult will tell one (perhaps 
incorrectly) that a jury is composed of twelve individuals.  But even very good lawyers may not 
know how many people serve on a grand jury and probably will never have any contact with a 
grand jury.    
The Fourteenth Amendment was viewed as a ―peace treaty‖ to end the Civil War,321 to 
provide security against a future war,
322
 and to ―secure the fruits of victory.‖323  A key point is 
that the First Congress proposed twelve amendments, only ten of which were contemporaneously 
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ratified.
 324
  Had the Fourteenth Amendment framers followed the precedent of the proponents of 
the Bill of Rights, they would have submitted at least four separate amendments, each having its 
own enforcement clause.  This would have allowed the ratifiers to pick and choose among the 
various proposals.  The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment obviously made a reasoned choice 
to link these disparate amendments together.  We can only surmise that the Congressmen did this 
for the usual legislative reason: they thought they had a greater success of having these provisions 
all passed collectively than if they were submitted individually.  Thus understood, the framers 
wanted to use the popular provisions of the Amendment to secure passage of its more 
controversial provisions.  This means that some of the consequences anticipated by the framers 
may not have been intended or desired by all of the ratifiers.  
             As David Kyvig has written in his book, which received the Bancoft Prize, ―to combine a 
number of proposals into a single measure subtly but perceptibly shifted critical decision-making 
from the ratifiers to the initial adopters of an amendment resolution.  Unlike the 1790s 
experience, states would confront a take-it-or-leave it, all-or-nothing choice.‖ 325 Thus, unlike 
other constitutional amendments, in which the concerns of the ratifiers may be paramount, the 
framers have a large role to play in the Fourteenth Amendment.  This insight may help unravel 
why states would vote to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment and then not conform their state 
constitution to comply with its provisions.  While the full picture should include the view of both 
the framers and the ratifiers, Professor Kyvig's insight is still critically important.  
            Even when examined in its parts, no loyal person from 1866 to 1868 would vote against 
any section of the ―peace treaty‖ simply because of an aversion to grand jury requirements.  This 
applied, with even greater force, to the entire amendment combined.  The stakes were too high: 
what the Fourteenth Amendment promised was too important and what the grand jury provision 
provided were too trivial by comparison.  
        With respect to the criminal procedure matters, there are at least three other observations of 
note.  First, Bingham himself was served as a highly regarded defense counsel in criminal cases 
and was the prosecutor for Tuscarawas County, Ohio. 
326
  As it does today, at the time Bingham 
was practicing criminal law, the Ohio Constitution required that indictments be made by grand 
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juries. 
327
  There is nothing to suggest that when Bingham said the fourteenth amendment would 
include enforcement of the Bill of Rights, he thought there was an exception for the grand jury 
clause.  Indeed, when Bingham recalled the framing of the amendment in 1871 and read the first 
eight amendments to the House of Representatives, his reading of the Fifth Amendment included 
both the right of indictment before a grand jury and the right against self-incrimination.
328
 
             A similar point can be made with respect to Senator Howard.  When Howard indicated to 
the Senate that the Amendment would enforce ―the first eight amendments‖ against the states, 
there is no indication that he made any exceptions for the grand jury or any other provision. 
329
  
Professor Dripps indicates that in his ―famous speech,‖ Senator Howard ―mentions many Bill-of-
Right particulars, but not grand jury indictment‖ as if that in some way undermined Howard‘s 
claim that ―the first eight amendments‖ were privileges or immunities under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
330
  Professor Thomas makes substantially the same argument. 
331
  But a fuller 
examination of Howard‘s speech belies this claim.  
             In his discussion of the Article IV Privileges and Immunities clause, Howard quoted 
forty-seven lines of text in the Congressional Globe from Justice Bushrod Washington‘s opinion 
in Corfield v. Coryell. 
332
  While that opinion lists certain privileges and immunities, a portion of 
Corfield, also quoted by Senator Howard, stated Washington‘s opinion that: ―These, and many 
others which might be mentioned [but were not], are, strictly, privileges and immunities‖ to be 
enjoyed under the provision. 
333
  Senator Howard indicated that the privileges and immunities of 
U.S. citizens ―cannot be fully defined in their entire extent and precise nature . . . .‖ 334 
Nevertheless, referring to all of the Fourteenth Amendment rights outlined in Corfield, Howard 
indicated that ―to these must be added the personal rights guaranteed and secured by the first 
eight amendments of the Constitution; . . . .‖ 335   
            Howard did not say the first eight amendments— excepting the two parts of the Fifth 
Amendment to which Professor Dripps objects—are the privileges or immunities of U.S. 
citizenship.   Rather, Howard said ―the first eight amendments.‖  Immediately after the semicolon 
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shown above, Howard proceeded to say ―such as‖ and then he paraphrased336 most, but not all of 
the amendments.  It is true that in his paraphrasing of the examples (―such as‖), Howard does not 
include the right to a grand jury indictment.  But the term ―such as‖ gives clear notice that other 
matters are included.  Further,  Howard does clearly say ―secured by the first eight amendments 
to the Constitution‖ and he puts the listener/reader on notice three times that his list is not 
exhaustive: once when he quoted from Corfield; once when he said that all the privileges and 
immunities cannot be outlined; and once when he used the terms ―such as.‖  337  Given this 
context, one cannot reasonably draw an inference from the omission of an example that Howard 
did not mean what he said: that ―the first eight amendments‖ were to be enforced.  
            Bryan Wildenthal is surely correct when he writes: 
                           Given the political imperatives for Republicans supporting 
                            ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is doubtful whether  
                            anyone considered or cared much about the relatively minor particulars 
                            in which some states were not already in conformity with the Bill of  
Rights. That could have been worked out by litigation or legislation. 
338
 
VIII. 
Conclusion 
A. 
Summary 
Together, Representative John A. Bingham and Senator Jacob M. Howard authored the 
whole of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Bingham was the floor manager in the House 
and Senator Howard was the floor manger in the Senate.  Both Bingham and Howard stated that 
among the privileges and immunities of the Amendment were the rights protected under the 
Federal Bill of Rights and these were to be enforced against the states.  When they spoke, they 
spoke not for themselves, but for the Joint Committee and, as the results show, for the 
overwhelming majority of the Congress.  The amendment passed by significant majorities in the 
House (120-32) and the Senate (33-11).  
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The Amendment itself was the central issue of the Congressional elections of 1866, and both the 
Republicans and the Amendment won by overwhelming majorities.  This election was a 
―disastrous defeat‖ for President Johnson and his Democratic allies.339  Former Union General 
and Republican Senator (R-Mo.) and later U.S. Secretary of the Interior  (1877-81), Carl Schurz 
had nothing but scorn for the Democratic claims of state rights, stating: ―In the name of liberty 
[they] asserted the right of one man, under State law, to deprive another man of his  freedom‖ and 
―they will tell you now that they are no longer true freemen in their States because . . . [they] can 
no longer deprive other men of their rights.‖340  The ―state rights‖ for which the Democrats 
campaigned was the ―right‖ to exclude native born Blacks from citizenship and the rights to ―do 
wrong‖ to Blacks and other Unionists.  In spite of the opposition of the most racist President in 
U.S. history and of the Democratic party, which chose to campaign almost exclusively upon race, 
the Amendment was ratified, often with approval by overwhelming majorities in the individual 
state legislatures. 
341
  Yet, sometime between five and eight years later it was a virtually nullity.  
Indeed, it had been ―nullified‖ in the spirit of John C. Calhoun and suffered a fate not unlike the 
Fifteenth Amendment was soon to suffer.  
        In the quest to determine the meaning of the privilege and immunities clause, others have 
documented its long lineage and noted that the terms have been used in North America for over 
two hundred fifty years before their use in the Fourteenth Amendment.
342
  Though it is no doubt 
true that the two words once served distinctive purposes, at least by the time of Justice Miller‘s 
decision in the Slaughter-House Cases, the entire Court used the word ―rights‖ as a synonym of 
privileges and immunities. 
343
  Thus, the question of the meaning of this clause is: what are the 
―rights of U.S. citizens‖?   
             To answer that question we should begin with the text and interpret it in a way that is 
both reasonable and designed to apply principles of freedom, and not those of states rights and 
slavery.  Such an interpretation begins with the recognition that the text was thought by 
contemporaries to be ―clear.‖   
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            On the campaign trail in 1866, General and future President Garfield told the people that 
the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment were ―few in number, easily understood . . . .‖ 344  The 
conservative Republican Governor of Ohio, a former Major General in the Union Army, told the 
legislature that ―a single statement of these propositions is their complete justification . . . .‖ 345  
Professor Rosenthal notes that an editorial in the New York Times termed Howard‘s speech ―clear 
and cogent.‖ 346  Further, Professor Thomas notes that ―[q]uite a few newspapers‖ simply quoted 
the amendment, acting as if the ―meaning was clear enough.‖ 347  On May 27, 1866, only two 
days after Senator Howard‘s speech, the New York Tribune, probably the most influential 
newspaper in the country at the time, indicated that debate would be short because the subject 
was ―already thoroughly discussed and understood . . . .‖ 348 
               Justice Swayne indicated that with respect to Section 1:  
          No searching analysis is necessary . . . .  Its language is intelligible and direct.  Nothing  
            can be more transparent. Every word employed has an established significance. There  
            is no room for construction.  There is nothing to construe.  Elaboration may obscure,  
            but cannot make clearer, the intent and purpose sought to be carried out.‖ 349   
Contrary to what has been implied, there is absolutely nothing to suggest that the public 
at large and the members of the legislatures who ratified the Amendment did not share the 
common understandings of the framers in Congress.  In spite of the attempts of the executive 
branch to prosecute those who violated various provisions of the Bill of Rights, no scrap of 
evidence has ever been presented to suggest that it was alleged that the framers committed 
―fraud‖ upon any legislature by asking them to ratify an amendment they did not understand.  No 
scholar who lived through the ratification period claimed that either Bingham or Howard‘s views 
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were unknown to the public.  Knowing what we know about the politics of that era, there is no 
reason to disbelieve, and every reason to believe, that the members of the legislature either knew 
of the debates in Congress and/or shared the common understanding of the privileges of 
immunities with members of Congress. 
350
   
Part of the reason for this is because the people of this generation lived through shared 
experiences that allowed them to have shared understandings.  For example there is a famous 
incident where Massachusetts tried to vindicate the rights of its African American citizens under 
the Article IV privilege or immunities clause by sending Judge Hoar to South Carolina to meet 
with authorities and, perhaps, to even initiate litigation.  In 1866 Representative Delano (R-Ohio) 
called all of this to his listeners‘ minds with a single sentence: ―I know that you remember when 
an able lawyer from Massachusetts was expelled from South Carolina by a Southern mob.‖ 351  
To a modern day reader this would not mean much.  But to his audience it conveyed a whole 
story without even the mention of the able lawyer‘s name or his mission.  It was shared 
knowledge of events like this which this generation had lived through that allowed the 
Republican majority to share common goals and common understandings.  
We see this same phenomena when we read Professor Tiedman‘s remarks on why he 
thought the Supreme Court was justified in ―amending‖ the Fourteenth Amendment.  Tiedman 
did not claim that his view or the action of the Court vindicated the will of the people (or their 
state legislatures) against a rogue Congress.  Rather he was focused upon ―the people‖ 
themselves, who he thought had been ―blinded by passion.‖  It was ―the popular will‖ that the 
Court—though not the Congress—―dared to withstand . . . .‖ 352  The problem was not that the 
ratifiers misunderstood the framers, but that they both understood the will of the people and acted 
accordingly. 
353
  From 1868 until 1949 no prominent scholar disputed the clearness of the purpose 
of the Amendment or that its purpose had been nullified.  While some people lamented this fact, 
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the opponents ―manfully‖ (they were all men) admitted that the Amendment was being nullified 
and celebrated that fact. 
354
   
355
      
Speaking of the U.S. Constitution, Senator Timothy Howe (R-Wisc.) said that ―we have 
formerly taken the Constitution in a solution of the spirit of States rights.  Let us now take it as it 
is sublimed and crystallized in the flames of the most gigantic war in history.‖356  Professor Curtis 
connects to that the statement of conservative Congressman George Anderson (R-Missouri) that 
―we are today interpreting the Constitution from a freedom and not a slavery standpoint.‖ 357  
Neither the framers nor the ratifiers intended to continue to interpret the Constitution or the 
Amendment from the slavery or states‘ rights points of view. 358                      
If we look to the Amendment from a ―freedom standpoint‖ this is what we find:  
If we look at the plain language of Section 1 and ask ―What are the rights of U.S. citizens?‖, the 
most natural meaning is the Bill of Rights and other provisions of the Construction such as habeas 
corpus.  We might have a vibrant discussion about whether the privilege or immunities (rights of 
U.S. citizens) include a ―right to family life‖ 359 or the Jacksonian Democrats‘ anti-monopoly 
views.  But at the core, there should be no dispute that they include the Bill of Rights.  If one 
asked what are the rights of U.S. citizens, the average person today and in the 19
th
 century would 
answer the Bill of Rights.
360
 
To be sure, private or secret understandings cannot be indulged and can have no effect.  
But public statements of the framers made in public fora are certainly strong evidence of the 
public understanding of the terms used in the Amendment.  Moreover, given Dr. Kyvig‘s insight 
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about the affect of combining multiple provisions into one amendment, and the binary choice that 
imposed upon the ratifiers, good faith requires that we make efforts to harmonize the views of the 
framers and the ratifiers where we can reasonably do so.  In this vein, we should not hold the 
privileges or immunities clause to a higher standard of proof than we do other constitutional 
provisions.  Rather, whether we rely upon the new pronouncements of Justice Scalia in Heller
361
 
or the somewhat dated statements of Justice Holmes, 
362
 the result is the same.  If the record in 
Heller supports an individual right to bear arms under the Second Amendment, then it applies a 
fortiori that the record of the Fourteenth Amendment supports enforcing the principles of the Bill 
of Rights against the states.  
            Howard specifically stated that among the privileges or immunities are the rights 
contained in the ―first eight amendments‖; Bingham stated that they will protect the ―Bill of 
Rights‖ (at least 7 times including his statements in the discussion of the Civil Rights Act), and 
that House Judiciary Chairman Wilson stated the Civil Rights Act will protect the ―Bill of 
Rights‖ and that the Bill of Rights need to be enforced.  Professor Thomas suggests that 
Bingham‘s legal analysis was too complex for ―the public‖ to understand.363  But all of these 
public statements—―the bill of rights‖ and ―the first eight amendments‖—were terms ―the 
people‖ could understand. 364  
Corroborating this view, if we look to the discussion of the abuses against which the 
Amendment was to correct, we find claims of violations or of the need for protections such as: 
―inalienable rights,‖365 ―individual rights,‖366 ―personal liberty,‖367 ―every right and privilege 
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belonging to a freeman,‖368 ―rights of man,‖ 369 ―every constitutional right upon every inch of 
U.S. soil,‖370 and ―natural rights.‖ 371  With the exception of ―natural rights,‖372 these terms are 
generally broad enough to encompass the rights protected by the Bill of Rights.  Even when only 
one example—often free speech—is given, it is often made clear that this is only the ―chief‖ right 
of the ―rights of man‖ or other general rights about which they were talking. 373  These terms are 
terms that ―the people‖ could understand at their core, even if there are disagreements at the 
margins.  These general claims can all be harmonized with the framers‘ actions in the Congress. 
Professor Amar has asked: ―Who wants to campaign against the Bill of Rights?‖ 374  
While he was writing about the political campaigns in 1866, there are people today who are 
―campaigning‖ against the Bill of Rights.  In briefly sketching the history of this campaign, it is 
proper to recur to statements of Senator Howe and Congressman Anderson in order to consider 
how the constitution has been interpreted in a slavery/states rights ―standpoint.‖  Essentially, it 
involved protecting slavery at all costs and being willing to use both states rights and national 
power to do so.  It included indulging in every possible interpretation against freedom and 
embracing every possible interpretation in favor of slavery.  
The attempts to defeat the Amendment are rather reminiscence of Confederate General 
Joseph E. Johnston‘s ―masterful delaying‖ defense of Atlanta.375  It is said that while he fought 
one battle against General Sherman, he had a series of trenches prepared for his troops to retreat 
to for the next several battles.  At first, we find opponents of the Bill of Rights fighting in the 
open.  Contemporaries, except for the Democrats in Congress who wanted the amendment to fail, 
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thought the language was ―clear.‖376  Historian James McPherson indicates that Americans of the 
revolution and later generations considered ―liberty‖ to be the ―birthright‖ of Americans of 
European descent and that it ―usually meant‖ ―the rights of states and localities, the freedom of 
the press, of speech, of assembly, of religion, the right to security in person and home against 
unreasonable search and seizure, the right to bear arms, the right to a trial by jury, the sanctity of 
property, and the writ of habeas corpus.‖377  
Once the times had changed so that the defeat of the Amendment‘s purpose could no 
longer be celebrated,
378
 the opponents of the Bill of Rights adopted a different strategy and 
retreated to the next line of trenches.  Those who want to ―campaign‖ against the Bill of Rights 
take a variety of approaches, but they all result in a narrower interpretation wrought by using a 
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In the interest of clarity, I should emphasize that I am not suggesting that all of those who opposed 
incorporation were opposed to Black rights.  To the contrary,  Charles Fairman was in favor of  de-
segregation and Justice Jackson and Justice Frankfurter participated in the unanimous decision in Brown v. 
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  I am suggesting that the state governments overstepping its 
proper boundaries and oppressing people before and after the Civil War caused the 39
th
 Congress to enact, 
among other provisions, the Fourteenth Amendment.  By the same token, it was the states‘ abdication of 
their duties to their citizens and the overstepping of their proper boundaries to oppress citizens before and 
after World War II that caused the Court to begin to implement the true meaning of the Amendment. Those 
who oppose the application of the Bill of Rights to the state need to ponder this history and the effect their 
views would have had if adopted by the Court in the 1950s and 1960s and the effect it could have in the 
future, looking not only to the amendments affecting the criminal procedure, but also to other rights such as 
those protected by the first amendment.  
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different standard than that used for other amendments
379
 and other portions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
                Next, opponents used ad hominine attacks upon Bingham and Howard claiming both 
were confused. 
380
  As the falsity of those claims were uncovered, the opponent claimed that 
Howard‘s speech was not reported to the public. 381  Yet Professor Curtis established that it had 
been reported in at least three major newspapers
382
 and Professor Thomas has added two more to 
the list. 
383
  A different approach is to try to claim that the Amendment only guaranteed equal 
protection and/or nondiscrimination.  But that argument fails because nondiscrimination and 
equality were one of the privileges or immunities of U.S. citizenship.  If it were the only one, then 
there would be no need to use both terms (―privileges‖ and ―immunities‖), and they would be 
singular and not plural.  A current approach is to look at the Amendment with the proverbial 
jaundiced eye and resolve all possible interpretative issues against its ordinary reading and 
against being consistent with the explanation of the framers.  Any speech, newspaper article, or 
other evidence cannot be held to be supportive of harmonizing the view of the framers and the 
ratifiers unless it is impossible to imagine some possible ambiguity or inconsistency.   
A famous Judge claims that the amendment is only an ―inkblot‖ that he cannot 
understand. 
384
 Yet, as Justice Robert Jackson, no friend to an expansive reading of the 
Amendment, recognized that standards were begin applied to the Fourteenth Amendment that had 
not been applied to other provisions of the Constitution:  
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 Amendment.  
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 I realize that Professor Thomas believes that more newspapers would be needed to show that the 
members of the state legislature understood the Amendment‘s purpose.  I think it is fair to believe that the 
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citing nay works of history.‖  Martin S. Flaherty, Post-Originalism, 68 U. OF CHIC. L. REV. 1089, 1111 
(2001).  
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This Court has not been timorous about giving concrete meaning to such  
obscure and vagrant phrases as ‗due process,‘ ‗general welfare,‘ ‗equal 
protection,‘ or even ‗commerce among the several States.‘ 385 
            Another trench into which opponents retreat is the one that holds that unless a statement 
explicitly states all of the provisions of all of the first eight amendments, it must be supportive of 
only ―selective incorporation.‖ 386  Of course, this ignores the fact that the clause includes non-
Bill of Rights provisions like habeas corpus, right to access to the courts, and other matters.  
Further, this is certainly an ungenerous reading of the Amendment and fails any attempt to try to 
reconcile the views of the framers with those of the ratifiers.  Moreover, it must be recalled that 
the very idea of ―selective incorporation‖ was not mentioned in any court case until 1947.387  No 
one has produced any citation to any contemporaneous court decision or speaker that suggests 
one could divide the Bill of Rights and apply some to the state and not others.  To the contrary, 
the theories of the time would seem to be more consistent with the second Justice Harlan‘s 
assertion, first called to my attention by Professor Thomas: either Section 1 incorporates all of 
these rights or it incorporated none.‖ 388  
            This would suggest that advocating the enforcement of any one of the eight amendments 
would support the claim of the floor managers that all are to be enforced.  Even if one took a 
narrower view than the second Justice Harlan, unless the statement said ―only‖ a certain provision 
of the Bill of Rights, it is just as likely to corroborate the framer‘s views as to dispute them.  Any 
such ambiguities should be resolved in favor of harmonizing the views of the framers and the 
ratifiers.  
               But the continued effort to avoid the enforcement of the Bill of Rights against the states, 
the retreat from one trench into the next, reminds one of the refrain of a popular song in the 
1970‘s by Credence Clearwater Revival in the Fortunate Son lines about the tax collector coming 
to the house:    
And when you ask them ‗How much should we give?‘   
Ooh, they only answer More! More! More!‖389 
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             It  seems that no matter how much evidence is produced, how much additional support is 
provided for the understanding of both the framers and the ratifiers, or how many false-facts are 
exposed, those individuals who oppose the enforcement of the Bill of Rights against the states 
always ask for ―more.‖  I have no doubt that new research will continue to provide new 
information on whether or not the enforcement of the Bill of Rights against the states was 
understood by the framers and the ratifiers.  But even if it supports such enforcement, I have 
doubts that it will ever satisfy those who, for policy reasons, oppose the application of the Bill of 
Rights against the states.  They will always want ―more.‖   
                 Yet, if we use the star of freedom to guide our interpretation, then we have to fairly 
credit the ratifiers and the framers as having adopted the Amendment with the understanding that 
it would enforce Bingham‘s ―Bill of Rights‖ and Howards ―first eight amendments‖ against the 
states.   
B. 
The Future 
             The reconstruction era, the actions of the Congress, and actions of the Courts are 
inherently interesting to a number of people both from a historical and a legal standpoint.  
Consequently, I would assume that these questions will be with us for the long-term and that at 
least a small number of people will continue to research, make new discoveries, develop new 
ideas, and analyze these times and the meaning of the Amendment.  Though this is only a 
surmise, I suspect that the enhanced interest in the area and the increase in the number of scholars 
writing in the area today has something to do with the Heller case and the question of whether it 
will be enforced against the states.  As I have previously noted, this prospect inspires hope for 
some and fear for others.
390
  Further, people who fear the grand jury abuse, no doubt have 
concerns that if the second amendment is enforced against the states, then the grand jury 
provisions may be as well.   
       Whether the future of scholarship on the enforcement of the Bill of Rights against the states 
will continue at an enhanced volume or will return to prior levels, depends, in large part, upon the 
actions of the Supreme Court.  If the Court quickly grants review and either rejects the 
enforcement of the Second Amendment against the states or accepts it based upon due process, 
then I suspect that the scholarship on the enforcement issue will return to ―normal‖ levels.  On the 
other hand, if the Court takes the approach it took prior to Batson v. Kentucky
391
 and allows the 
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matter to ―percolate‖ in the lower courts for a number of years, then I suspect scholarship will 
continue at an intense pace.
392
  Similarly, if the Court were to decide to enforce the Bill of Rights 
against the states based upon the privileges or immunities clause, then this might signal the 
potential for a realignment of the Supreme Court‘s decisions which had previously been based 
upon due process and would probably produce a torrent of scholarship.  
While we wait to see what the Court will do, I would suggest that we need to 
acknowledge that while not everyone agrees, there is nevertheless the ―scholarly consensus‖ of 
which Professor Barnett speaks.  We need to turn our attention from the old ―incorporation‖ 
debate (and the use of the approach Professor Lash advocates) and look to the question of what 
would be an invigorated privileges or immunities clause due beyond the Bill of Rights.  This 
process has, of course, been individually pursued by a number of scholars.  Moreover, it was the 
subject of a major conference at the University of Pennsylvania this past November,
393
 and will 
be the focus of at least one panel at the Law & Society conference in May 2009.  
Lincoln said that at the time of the Declaration of Independence‘s proclamation that all 
men were created equal, it ―was of no practical use in effecting our separation from Great Britain; 
and it was placed in the Declaration, not for that, but for future use.  Its authors meant it to be, 
thank God, it is now proving itself, a stumbling block to those who in after time might seek to 
turn a free people back to into the hateful paths of despotism.‖ 394   
Like the Declaration, Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment outlines the rights of U.S. 
citizens and citizenship in broad terms which can inspire not only leaders and office-holders, but 
the people themselves.  As my colleague Elizabeth Reilly has noted, Section 1 contains ―stunning 
opening phrases‖ that include ―sweeping evocations of individual rights‖ including the privileges 
or immunities clause. 
395
  And the Fourteenth Amendment brings ―hope‖ to all who read it.396  
But, unlike the Declaration, the Fourteenth Amendment had a very practical purpose. It was 
designed to offer federal protection to the most precious rights of American citizens that pre- and 
post-Civil War events demonstrated were so essential.  Those who oppose this application of the 
Bill of Rights to the states may be acting in good faith, but the effect of their view would be to 
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turn the protection of the most important rights over to the states which  have shown time and 
time again that they are not equal to the task.  To fail to provide that protection was, in the past, 
and would be in our future, in the words of General, Congressman, and President Hayes, ―wrong 
in principle, wrong in its details, and finally wrong as a precedent and example for the future.‖397  
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